摘要
选取2015—2020年沪深A股上市公司数据为研究样本,探究在外部监督的作用下,投资者情绪对公司盈余管理行为的影响,并深入挖掘不同类型外部监督在二者关系中的调节效应。研究发现,投资者情绪与盈余管理存在U型非线性关系,监督型机构投资者、外部审计以及交易所发函问询等外部监督的介入会缓释投资者情绪对盈余管理的影响程度。进一步研究发现:情绪低落期,盈余管理程度随着情绪的波动出现先增后减的倒U型变化趋势;情绪高涨期,投资者情绪与盈余管理呈现先减后增的U型非线性关系;对于成长型、高管持股比例高的企业,投资者情绪与盈余管理的U型关系更为显著。将外部监督纳入投资者情绪与盈余管理的研究,丰富了关于投资者情绪变动对公司治理行为的研究,为发挥外部治理手段的监督效能、优化市场监管环境、实现高质量发展提供经验证据。在未来监管中,监督型机构投资者在拓宽投资渠道的同时,应当加强监督意愿;第三方审计机构应提升审计质量、提高审计效率;证券交易所则应不断优化我国非处罚性监管制度。
This paper selects the data of A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 as the sample to explore the impact of investor sentiment on earnings management under the role of external supervision,and deeply explores the regulatory effect of different types of external supervision on the relationship between the two.The study finds that there is a U-shaped nonlinear relationship between investor sentiment and earnings management,and the intervention of external supervision such as supervisory institutional investors,external auditors,and inquiries sent by exchanges will slow down the impact of investor sentiment on earnings management.Further research shows that:(1)in the period of low sentiment,earnings management increases first and then decreases with the fluctuation of sentiment in an inverted U-shaped trend;during the period of high sentiment,investor sentiment and earnings management shows a U-shaped nonlinear relationship of decreasing first and then increasing;(2)For growth oriented enterprises with a high proportion of senior executives,the U-shaped relationship between investor sentiment and earnings management is more significant.This paper brings external supervision into the research on investor sentiment and earnings management,which enriches the research on the impact of investor sentiment changes on corporate governance behavior and provides empirical evidence for exerting the supervision effectiveness of external governance means,optimizing the market supervision environment,and achieving high-quality development.In the future supervision,supervisory institutional investors should strengthen their willingness to supervise while expanding their investment channels.The third-party audit institutions should improve the audit quality and efficiency and stock exchanges should optimize the non-penalty supervision system.
作者
李芳
于寅健
王松
LI Fang;YU Yinjian;WANG Song(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao,Shandong 266590,China)
出处
《山东科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2023年第4期96-112,共17页
Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371111)
山东省高等学校人文社科研究项目(J16YF03)。
关键词
盈余管理
投资者情绪
监督型机构投资者
外部审计
问询监管
earnings management
investor sentiment
supervised institutional investors
external audit
inquiry supervision
