摘要
民营经济高质量发展有赖于法律环境的优化,本文聚焦民营企业脱虚向实的现实需要,以2008—2020年为样本区间对CEO法律责任能否促进企业脱虚向实进行实证检验。研究发现,当CEO担任企业的法定代表人时,企业的金融化程度更低。机制检验结果表明,CEO法律责任的增加是通过降低代理成本和缓解融资约束,从而抑制企业金融化。进一步分析发现,当CEO任期较短、市场竞争程度较高时,两者的负向关系更显著;CEO法律责任能够削弱企业金融化对研发创新的挤出效应。
The legal system is necessary for the private economy to develop in a high-quality direction.This paper empirically investigates whether CEO legal responsibility can facilitate enterprise"return to reality"using a sample period of 2008-2020.It focuses on the economic demands of private enterprises for"return to reality",This paper discovered that the firm's level of financialization is lower when the CEO acts as the statutory representative.The results of the mechanism test show that the increased legal responsibility of the CEO is intended to prevent company financialization by lowering agency cost and easing financing restrictions.When the CEO's tenure is shorter and the market competition is stronger,further analysis shows that the negative correlation is more significant.Lastly,the result reveals that CEO legal responsibility can lessen the corporate financialization's effect of crowding out R&D innovation.The conclusions add to the body of knowledge in the fields of law and finance while also serving as a guide for the real economy's"return to reality"and encouraging the high-quality growth of private firms.
作者
李梦晓
董雅浩
彭博
贺晨
Li Mengxiao;Dong Yahao;Peng Bo;He Chen
出处
《财经科学》
北大核心
2023年第8期108-122,共15页
Finance & Economics
基金
成都理工大学哲学社会科学研究基金项目“自由贸易试验区建设对川渝企业跨国供应链风险的影响研究”的资助。
关键词
CEO
企业金融化
法定代表人
代理成本
融资约束
CEO
Financialization
Statutory Representative
Agency Cost
Financial Constraints
