摘要
构建地方政府、开发商和投机者的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab仿真,考量“房住不炒”定位下各主体决策行为与演化稳定均衡。结果表明:地方政府选择“积极调控”、开发商选择“原价或降价”和投机者选择“观望”时有利于进化稳定策略实现;在当前房产税试点税率下,调控政策效果未达到预期;调控执行成本、开发商寻租成本和投机者房价预期会显著影响各主体的策略选择。鉴于此,“房住不炒”定位下应兼顾多方利益需求,深化房产税改革、降低调控执行成本等,促进调控目标实现。
By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government,developers and speculators,this paper analyzes the decision-making behavior and evolutionary stable equilibrium of each subject under the condition of“houses for living and not for investment”based on Matlab simulation.The results show that when local governments choose“active regulation”,developers choose“original price or price reduction”and speculators choose“wait and see”,it is conducive to the realization of evolutionary stability strategy;Under the current pilot tax rate of real estate tax,the effect of regulation and control policies has not reached expectations;The implementation cost of regulation,the rent-seeking cost of developers and the expectation of speculators'house prices will significantly affect the strategic choice of each subject.In view of this,we should take into account the needs of various interests under the principle of“houses for living and not for investment”,and promote the realization of the regulatory objectives by deepening real estate tax reform,reducing the implementation cost of regulation.
作者
鞠方
阿月荷
白怡颖
JU Fang;A Yuehe;BAI Yiying(Business School,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan,Hunan 411105,China)
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第4期121-128,共8页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部哲学社会科学重大课题攻关项目(21JZD024)
国家自然科学基金(71873117)
湖南省自科基金(2021JJ30023)。
关键词
房住不炒
三方演化博弈
演化稳定策略
houses for living and not for investment
tripartite evolutionary game
evolutionary stability strategy
