摘要
分行业信息披露对审计质量具有双重影响。它强化了行业经营性信息列报,有助于提高信息透明度和溢出性,为审计师发现异常提供便利,进而提升审计质量;行业经营性信息披露本身也可能会带来额外的验证负担,甚至会引发更隐蔽的操纵,反而会增加审计难度,导致审计质量下降。基于分行业信息披露指引发布这一准自然实验场景发现,分行业披露政策总体上提升了审计质量,即信息透明度效应占主导。进一步检验显示,分行业披露对审计质量的正向影响在内部控制水平较高、审计师具有行业专长时更为明显,但随着公司文本操纵风险的提高,正向关系显著减弱。以上结论对于理解分行业信息披露模式下的审计质量变化具有重要启示。
Based on the quasi natural experiment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges' staggered release of information disclosure guidelines for listed companies by sub-sector,this paper empirically tests the impact of disclosure by industry on the audit quality.The difference-in-difference model result shows that the implementation of disclosure policies in different industries has significantly increased the audit quality.This effect is more pronounced in firms with high-quality internal control and audit firms with industry expertise.However,as the risk of corporate text manipulation increases,the above positive relationship will be significantly weakened.The conclusion provides reference for understanding the change in audit quality under the model of information disclosure by sub-sector in China.
作者
黄昊
赵玲
Huang Hao;Zhao Ling
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第3期136-147,共12页
Auditing Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:72102187、72102192)的资助。
关键词
分行业信息披露
审计质量
内部控制
行业专长
disclosure by industry
audit quality
internal control
industry expertise
