摘要
绿色创新是推动高质量发展和实现“双碳”目标的重要动力。本文以领导干部自然资源资产离任审计的试点为准自然事件,实证检验了此项审计制度对地区绿色创新水平的影响。研究发现,相对于非试点城市,审计试点城市的绿色创新水平显著提升。异质性分析表明,领导干部自然资源资产离任审计对绿色创新的正向影响显著存在于官员晋升压力较大、制度环境优良以及资源型城市之中。作用机制检验发现,领导干部自然资源资产离任审计通过促使地方政府增加财政环保支出和加大环境行政处罚力度进而提升地区绿色创新水平。本文为理解领导干部自然资源资产离任审计更好发挥环境治理效能提供了增量的经验证据和决策参考,也丰富了“波特假说”关于绿色创新领域的研究文献。
Green innovation is an important driver for high-quality development and the achievement of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals.This paper takes the pilot project of natural resources and assets accountability audit of outgoing leading officials as the exogenous event to test the impact of the audit on regional green innovation.The study found that compared with non-pilot cities,the level of green innovation in pilot cities was significantly improved.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive effect of natural resources and assets accountability audit of outgoing leading officials on green innovation exists in cities with good institutional environment or rich resources or where leading officials face high promotion pressure.The results show that natural resources and assets accountability audits of outgoing leading officials can improve regional green innovation by urging local governments to increase fiscal expenditure on environmental protection and strengthen relevant administrative punishment.This paper provides new empirical evidence and decision-making reference for understanding the role natural resources and assets accountability audits of outgoing leading officials can play in environmental governance,and also enriches the research literature in the field of green innovation on the Porter Hypothesis.
作者
陈骏
单美贤
谭建华
Chen Jun;Shan Meixian;Tan Jianhua
出处
《审计研究》
北大核心
2023年第3期19-32,共14页
Auditing Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号:72172062)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目批准号:72102110)的资助。
关键词
领导干部自然资源资产离任审计
绿色创新
财政环保支出
环境行政处罚
natural resources and assets accountability audit of outgoing leading officials
green innovation
fiscal expenditure on environmental protection
environment-related administrative punishment
