摘要
证言非正义是米兰达·弗里克在认知非正义中一个重要组成部分,它集中反映了认知和伦理的交叉性问题,其中一个最典型的问题涉及对不受谴责的证言非正义所承担的道德责任何以可能的论证。弗里克借用“行为者遗憾”的道德运气理论加以回应,却因道德运气与道德理性之间的不相容使问题再次陷入僵局。对此,尝试以弗里克所提出的证言正义的德性作为问题沟通的介质,不仅为化解证言非正义的概念分化提供了可能性辩护,也为探寻证言正义德性路径的可行性提供了必要的前提论证。
Miranda Frick proposed testimonial injustice in epistemic injustice,which represented the interdisciplinary problem mainly related to epistemology and ethic.One of the most typical issues is about how to demonstrate the possibility of moral responsibility for inculpable testimonial injustice.Frick applied the moral luck theory of“agent regret”to respond to this problem,but the effort was deadlocked again because of the incompatibility between moral luck and moral rationality.So trying to take the virtue of testimonial justice proposed by Frick as the medium of communication,which not only provides a possible defense for resolving the problem of the differentiation of the concept of testimony injustice,but also provides a necessary prerequisite for exploring the feasible path to the virtue of testimony justice.
作者
孔成思
KONG Chengsi(School of Marxism,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing,401120)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第7期34-40,共7页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目“当代科学中的认知非正义问题研究”(项目编号:22CZX026)。
关键词
证言非正义
身份偏见
道德判断
道德责任
Testimonial injustice
Identity prejudice
Moral judgment
Moral responsibility
