期刊文献+

基于利益相关者理论的IDI制度下三方博弈分析

Game Analysis of Three Parties Under IDI System Based on Stakeholder Theory
下载PDF
导出
摘要 工程质量潜在缺陷保险(IDI)成为解决住宅工程质量潜在缺陷的有效手段。目前我国IDI制度还在试点探索阶段,相关利益主体的协作关系还未明晰,配套的保障体系也未健全。基于利益相关者理论对IDI制度下参与住宅工程建设、保修与行政管理的建设单位、保险公司和政府三方利益主体进行博弈分析,建立了“建设单位-保险公司-政府”博弈模型,并求其均衡解,进而探究三方主体策略选择及其影响因素,明晰三者间相互促进及相互制约关系,并提出IDI制度良性运行的制度补偿方案。结果表明:政府对保险的补贴金额及对建设单位的补贴比例、保险公司管理成本、质量保险赔付额、工程质量潜在缺陷保险保费、建设单位的投保概率等因素会影响三方的策略选择。通过采取保险强制措施、优化IDI产品设计、建立完善保险体系等手段能有效地改进各个主体的行为,从而全面提升建筑行业的工程质量。 Inherent Defects Insurance(IDI)has become an effective means to solve the potential defects of residential engineeringquality.At present,China’s IDI system is still in the pilot exploration stage,the collaborative relationship of relevant interest subjectsis not yet clear,and the supporting guarantee system is not yet sound.Based on the stakeholder theory,this paper analyzes the gameamong the three stakeholders of IDI system:the contractor,insurance company and government.The game model of"constructionunit-insurance company-government"is established and seeks its equilibrium solution.Then,the strategy choice of the threestakeholders and its influence are explored.Finally,this research proposes a compensation scheme for the healthy operation of IDIsystem.The research results show that the amount of government subsidies for insurance and the proportion of subsidies forcontractors,the management cost of insurance companies,the amount of quality insurance payout,the insurance premium forpotential defects in construction quality,the probability of insurance for construction units,and other factors affect the strategicchoices of three parties.By adopting insurance compulsory measures,optimizing IDI product design,and establishing a perfectinsurance system,the behavior of each subject can be effectively improved,so as to comprehensively enhance the project quality inthe construction industry.
作者 代云云 林诺 周剑峰 安琪 张斌 DAI Yunyunl;LIN Nuo;ZHOU Jianfeng;AN Qi;ZHANG Bin(College of Building Science and Engineering,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China,E-mail:dyylzg@hotmail.com;Changzhou Institute of Building Science Group Co.Ltd.,Changzhou 213015,China;College of Civil Engineering,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)
出处 《工程管理学报》 2023年第2期31-36,共6页 Journal of Engineering Management
基金 江苏省高等学校基础科学(自然科学)研究项目(21KJB570010) 江苏省住建厅科学技术计划项目(2021JH11004) 扬州大学人文社科研究基金项目(xjj2020-31)。
关键词 IDI保险制度 利益相关者理论 三方博弈模型 制度补偿 IDI insurance system stakeholder theory three-party game model system compensation
  • 相关文献

参考文献14

二级参考文献89

共引文献85

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部