摘要
本文以2015-2019年沪深A股非金融类上市公司数据为样本,考察交易所问询函监管对分析师行为的影响。研究发现,被交易所问询函监管的公司,分析师跟踪数目更多,分析师盈余预测乐观度更低、准确度更高、分歧度更小;交易所问询函包含的问题数越多,需要中介机构或独立董事发表专业核查意见,涉及内部控制、收入等明确内容以及关联交易或并购等重大事项时,分析师跟踪数目更多,盈余预测乐观度更低、准确度更高、分歧度更小;分析师声誉越高、行业专长越高,对被问询的上市公司的盈余预测准确度越高、分歧度越小;交易所问询函监管会使分析师预测修正频率增加,有利于提高盈余预测准确度、降低分歧度,还能通过分析师渠道发挥一定的溢出效应,促进分析师整体盈余预测乐观度的降低、准确度的提升。所以,交易所问询函监管能够通过分析师渠道发挥外部治理效应,对改善我国上市公司信息环境具有重要意义。
From the perspective of analysts in the capital market,this paper systematically explores the impact of non-penalty regulation represented by exchange inquiry letters on analysts following and analysts’earnings forecasts.The results of the study show that companies inquired by exchange attract more analysts following,and analysts’earnings forecasts are less optimistic,more accurate and less divergent.When the inquiry letters contain more questions,need intermediary agencies or independent directors to issue professional verification opinions,involve clear contents such as internal control and income,and major matters such as related transactions or mergers and acquisitions,companies inquired by exchange attract more analysts following,and analysts’earnings forecasts are less optimistic,more accurate and less divergent.And the higher the analysts’reputation and industry expertise,the higher the accuracy and the smaller the divergence of the earnings forecasts for the listed companies inquired by the exchange.Exchange inquiry letters supervision can promote the analysts’earnings forecasts revision,which is conducive to improving earnings forecasts accuracy and reducing forecasts divergence.And it can exert spillover effects through analysts to promote the overall reduction of optimism and improvement of accuracy of earnings forecasts.Therefore,the exchange inquiry letters supervision can exert the external governance effect through analysts,which is of great significance to improve the information environment of China’s listed companies.
作者
陈蓉蓉
李远慧
CHEN Rong-rong;LI Yuan-hui(Beijing Jiaotong University,School of Economics and Management,Beijing 100044,China;Beijing Jiaotong University,Research Center for Central and Eastern Europe,Beijing 100044,China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第2期98-108,共11页
Commercial Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“减税降费抑制企业‘脱实向虚’的作用机理与治理效果研究”,项目编号:21YJA630051
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“产融结合对上市公司创新行为的影响研究”,项目编号:21FGLB011。
关键词
非处罚性监管
分析师跟踪
分析师盈余预测
信息环境
non-penalty regulation
analysts following
analysts’earnings forecasts
information environment
