摘要
文章以2007—2019年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了连锁股东对公司股价崩盘风险的影响。结果表明:连锁股东的存在显著降低了股价崩盘风险,支持“监督效应”假说;影响机制分析发现,连锁股东能够降低管理层隐藏负面消息的动机和机会,进而降低公司股价崩盘风险;进一步分析发现,产品市场竞争程度和行业地位能够影响连锁股东与股价崩盘风险间的关系,并且连锁股东有助于提升公司的信息披露质量。研究结论为理解连锁股东这一角色提供了新的证据,同时对防范金融风险提供了有益启示。
Taking A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as research samples,this paper investigates the impact of cross-ownership on the stock price crash risk.The empirical results show that cross-ownership significantly reduce the risk of stock price crash,which supports the hypothesis of“supervision effect”;the analysis of influence mechanism shows that cross-ownership can reduce the motivation and opportunity of management to hide negative news,and then reduce the risk of stock price crash;further analysis shows that product market competition and industry position can affect the relationship between cross-ownership and stock price crash risk,and cross-ownership can also improve the quality of information disclosure of a company.The research conclusion provides new evidence for understanding the role of crossownership and provides useful enlightenment for preventing financial risks.
作者
张焰朝
胡媛媛
ZHANG Yanchao;HU Yuanyuan(School of Accounting,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046,China;School of Accountancy,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《华东经济管理》
北大核心
2023年第5期96-106,共11页
East China Economic Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“供应链金融对企业投资行为的影响研究”(21YJC630001)
河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“数字化转型对财务决策的影响及路径研究—以河南上市企业为例”(2022CJJ124)。
关键词
连锁股东
监督效应
掩饰效应
股价崩盘风险
cross-ownership
supervision effect
masking effect
stock price crash risk
