摘要
基于国务院国资委披露的人事任免公告,手工整理2009—2019年央企集团高管职务任免数据库,以央企集团控股上市公司(简称“控股公司”)为研究对象,考察央企集团高管变更对控股公司投资效率的影响。研究发现:央企集团高管变更通过抑制过度投资行为显著提升控股公司投资效率,并且这种提升作用在高管职务变更类型为晋升和降职的央企集团中更为明显。机制检验发现,央企集团高管变更主要通过发挥威慑效应弱化代理动机和激励效应强化内部监督进而优化控股公司的投资决策。进一步研究发现,在控股公司行业竞争程度较高、高管权力较大以及央企集团持股比例较低的情况下,央企集团高管变更的威慑与激励效应更为明显。
Based on the personnel appointment and removal announcements disclosed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, this paper arranges manually the database of senior management appointments and removals of the central enterprise groups from 2009 to 2019 and takes the listed companies controlled by the central enterprise groups(referred to as“holding companies”) as the research objects to examine the impact of the executive changes of the central enterprise groups on the investment efficiency of the holding companies. The findings show that the executive changes in the central enterprise groups will significantly improve the investment efficiency of the holding companies by restraining excessive investment behaviors, and that this enhancing effect is more pronounced in the central enterprise groups where the types of executive job changes are promotions and demotions. The result of the mechanism test reveals that the executive changes in the central enterprise groups will optimize the investment decisions of the holding companies mainly by exerting a deterrent effect to weaken the agency incentives and an incentive effect to strengthen the internal supervision. Further study finds out that the deterrent and incentive effects of the executive changes in the central enterprise groups are more pronounced in the cases of higher industrial competition in the holding company, greater executive power and lower shareholding proportions of the central enterprise groups.
作者
杨兴全
赵锐
杨征
YANG Xing-quan;ZHAO Rui;YANG Zheng(Shihezi University,Shihezi 832000,China)
出处
《江西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期36-52,共17页
Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“多元化经营与公司现金股利政策:基于转轨经济背景的研究”(71762024)
“中国之治的政府行为与企业创新:基于国家队持股的研究”(72062027)
财政部“会计名家培养工程”(财会[2017]26号)
自治区研究生教育创新计划项目(XJ2022G093)。
关键词
央企集团高管变更
母子公司治理
投资效率
威慑效应
激励效应
executive changes of the central enterprise groups
parent-subsidiary corporation governance
investment efficiency
deterrence effect
incentive effect
