摘要
理清地下水超采的经济学博弈逻辑,对科学认识地下水超采形成和治理的市场动机具有基础意义。本文提出了经济学博弈视角的地下水超采逻辑框架,并从地下水开采的直接经济社会效益、超采造成的经济社会损失、超采的生态环境价值损失三个方面,量化解析了山西省汾河流域地下水超采的损益状况。研究成果对构建山西省汾河流域地下水保护和治理长效机制具有一定参考价值。
It’s of fundamental significance to study the economic game logic of groundwater overexploitation for better understanding of the market motivation in the formation and treatment of groundwater overexploitation.The paper puts forward the logic framework of groundwater overexploitation from the perspective of economic game,and quantitatively analyzes the profit and loss of groundwater overexploitation in Fenhe River basin of Shanxi Province from three aspects,including the direct economic and social benefits,the economic and social losses,and the eco-environmental value losses caused by overexploitation.The research is meaningful for the establishment of a long-term mechanism of groundwater protection and treatmentin the Fenhe River basin of Shanxi Province.
作者
郝春沣
牛存稳
谈幸燕
仇亚琴
贾仰文
HAO Chun-feng;NIU Cun-wen;TAN Xing-yan;QIU Ya-qin;JIA Yang-wen(State Key Laboratory of Simulation and Regulation of Water Cycle in River Basin,China Institute of Water Resources&HydropowerResearch,Beijing 100038,China)
出处
《地下水》
2023年第1期106-107,194,共3页
Ground water
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(52009140)
国家重点研发计划课题(2021YFC3201105)。
关键词
地下水治理
经济学损益
生态环境价值
山西省汾河流域
Groundwater treatment
Economic profit and loss
Eco-environmental value
Fenhe River basinof Shanxi Province
