摘要
通过构建零售商和制造商在不同退款保证下的决策模型,研究零售商引入自有品牌后的退款保证决策问题。比较不同情形下零售商的均衡解,讨论零售商的退款保证策略对最优定价决策的影响。研究表明:当自有品牌不提供退款保证且制造商品牌的满意度较小时,对制造商品牌提供退款保证有利于零售商和制造商;而当自有品牌提供退款保证时,2种产品都提供退款保证总是对零售商有利。另一方面,当制造商品牌不提供退款保证时,自有品牌提供退款保证总是对制造商有利;制造商品牌提供退款保证时,在特定范围内自有品牌提供退款保证对制造商和零售商都有利。
By constructing the policy making models of retailers and manufacturers under different money-back guarantees,the money-back guarantee policy-making of retailers in introducing store brands is studied.And by comparing the equilibrium solutions of retailers in different cases,the.influence of retailer's money-back guarantee strategy on the optimal pricing decision is discussed.The research shows that when the store brand does not provide a money-back guarantee and the national brand satisfaction is less,providing a money-back guarantee for the national brand is beneficial to.retailers and manufacturers,otherwise it is always beneficial for retailers to provide money-back guarantee for both products.On the other hand,when the national brand does not provide a moneyback guarantee,it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to provide a money-back guarantee for the store brand,otherwise it is beneficial for both manufacturers and retailers to provide a money back guarantee for the store brand within a certain range.
作者
裴秀媛
叶涛锋
PEI Xiuyuan;YE Taofeng(School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Zhenjiang 212003,Jiangsu,China)
出处
《信息与管理研究》
2023年第1期87-100,共14页
Journal of Information and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71771106)。
关键词
零售商
退款保证
自有品牌
最优定价
retailer
money-back guarantee
store brand
optimal pricing
