摘要
以2008—2020年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了高管薪酬黏性对研发操纵的治理效应及作用机制。研究结果发现:高管薪酬黏性能够显著抑制研发操纵;作用机制检验表明,代理成本的降低是高管薪酬黏性影响研发操纵的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,相较于“奖优-罚劣”型薪酬契约,具有黏性特征的“奖优-奖劣”型薪酬契约对研发操纵具有显著的抑制作用,尤其是业绩下降时高管薪酬略微增加的“奖优-低奖劣”型薪酬契约的治理作用更明显。此外,高管薪酬黏性还有助于缓解研发操纵对专利申请量和授权量的负面影响,提高公司未来创新产出。因此,企业应加强对研发费用异常情形的关注和监督,并构建“重赏轻罚”的高管薪酬黏性激励机制,充分发挥其在创新投资决策中的激励和约束效用;政府相关部门应营造“重赏轻罚”的营商环境,缓解创新决策者和参与者的后顾之忧。
Taking the A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2020 as the research sample,this paper examines the governance effect and mechanism of executive pay stickiness on R&D manipulation.The results show that executive compensation stickiness can significantly inhibit R&D manipulation.The mechanism test indicates that the reduction of agency cost is an important channel through which executive compensation stickiness affects R&D manipulation.Further study shows that,compared with the“reward excellent-punish inferior”salary contract,the“reward excellent-reward inferior”salary contract with viscous characteristics has a significant inhibitory effect on R&D manipulation,especially the governance effect of the“reward excellent-low reward inferior”salary contract with a slight increase in executive compensation when performance decreases.In addition,it is also helpful to alleviate the negative impact of R&D manipulation on patent applications and grants,and improve the company’s future innovation output.Therefore,enterprises should pay more attention to and supervise the abnormal situation of R&D expenses,build a sticky incentive mechanism of executive compensation with“heavy reward and light punishment”,and give full play to its incentive and restraint effect in innovation investment decision-making.Relevant government departments should create a social culture and innovation environment of“heavy reward and light punishment”to alleviate the worries of innovation decision makers and participants.
作者
史方
宁金辉
苑泽明
SHI Fang;NING Jinhui;YUAN Zeming(Accounting School,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China;School of Economics and Management,Hebei Agricultural University,Baoding,071000,China)
出处
《经济经纬》
北大核心
2023年第1期120-129,共10页
Economic Survey
基金
河北省教育厅高等学校人文社会科学研究青年拔尖人才项目(BJS2022003)
河北省社会科学基金项目(HB21GL042)
河北省省属高等学校基本科研业务费研究项目(KY2021076)。
关键词
高管薪酬黏性
研发操纵
代理成本
创新产出
治理
Stickiness of Executive Compensation
R&D Manipulation
Agency Cost
Innovation Output
Governance
