摘要
根据不完全契约理论,PPP协议权利(力)配置遵循普通契约的一般规律,是不同风险与不同控制权的排列组合。PPP协议又具有特殊性,它是政府以关系风险增加为代价向私主体转移绩效风险的产物,控制权类型相应划分为公共控制权与运营控制权。根据传统权力划分理论,在公共控制权与运营控制权固有权限之间仍存在一个权利(力)空间,它导致PPP协议公私主体权利(力)配置的困境。为避免政府自由裁量权对权利(力)空间的任意支配,PPP项目公私主体控制权应区分绝对范围与相对范围。相对控制权的划分可借鉴公众公司股东会与董事会的权力划分规则,优先配置给私主体,以突出PPP协议合作绩效最大化的治理目标,同时借助强制性程序规范,减少政府对私主体运营控制权的干预。
According to the theory of incomplete contracts,the allocation of rights(powers)in PPP agreements follows the general laws of ordinary contracts,and is an arrangement and combination of different risks and different control rights.The PPP agreement is also special.It is the product of the government’s transferring performance risks to private entities at the expense of increasing relational risks.The types of control powers are correspondingly divided into public control power and operational control power.According to the traditional power division theory,there is still a power space between the inherent power of public control and operational control,which leads to the dilemma of the allocation of rights(power)of public and private subjects in PPP agreements.In order to avoid the arbitrary domination of the power space by the government’s discretion,the control rights of public subjects and private subjects of PPP projects should be divided into absolute scope and relative scope.The division of control powers in the relative scope can learn from the rules of power division between the shareholders’meeting and the board of directors of public companies,and give priority to private entities to highlight the governance goal of maximizing the performance of PPP agreement cooperation while diminishing government’s intervention on the operational control rights of private subjects.
作者
胡莹莹
HU Ying-ying(Economic Law School of East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200063)
出处
《行政法学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期166-176,共11页
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
基金
司法部2018年度国家法治与法学理论研究项目“政府与社会资本合作(PPP)纠纷解决机制研究”(18SFB2050)。
