摘要
阿甘本的《业》一书在伦理学层面延续他以往的生命政治议题,批判性地考察了行动何以归责于作为行动者的主体并使他有过错的问题。在阿甘本看来,法律通过制裁使人原本无辜的行动变得有过错,这也是法律得以建立的前提。自由意愿的发明使得过错内在化——它连接了行动与主体,并将行动的责任归给主体。亚里士多德的伦理学将人界定为通过作为手段的行动追求作为目的善的主体,这使得善被分裂到主体之外,由此行动被外在规范捕获,责任主体得以建立。要使人从罪业中获得救赎,就必须切断行动与目的的连接,使行动成为作为纯粹手段的姿态,从而破除虚构的责任主体。
Agamben’s book Karman continues his previous bio-political issues in the aspect of ethics, critically examining how actions are attributed to the subject as the actor and make him at fault. In the view of Agamben, the law criminalizes innocent actions by imposing sanctions, which is the premise of the law. The invention of free will internalizes fault-it connects action with subject and assigns. Aristotle’s ethics defines man as a subject who pursues goodness through action as a means, which makes the good separate from the subject, thus action is captured by the external specification, the subject of responsibility is thus established. To redeem man from sin, we must cut off the link between action and purpose, making action a gesture of mere means, so as to get rid of the fictional subject of responsibility.
作者
徐瑞坤
周宜
Xu Ruikun;Zhou Yi
出处
《理论界》
2022年第11期27-33,共7页
Theory Horizon
关键词
业
罪业
行动
责任主体
姿态
Karman
crimen
action
subject of responsibility
gesture
