摘要
文章基于经典的EOQ模型,考虑碳限额约束下零售商可以进行采购合作时,以联盟总成本最低为目标构建了库存决策模型,并针对不同情形设计了使联盟保持稳定的、公平且易操作的运作成本分摊规则。具体结果表明:当不考虑每个零售商每次订购产品时的碳排放量时,如果需求量最大的零售商订货量较小时,总运作成本可根据每个零售商持有成本占总持有成本比例进行分摊,反之则需求量最大的零售商分摊订购成本与自身的持有成本,而其他零售商分摊持有成本;当不考虑零售商持有产品的碳排放量时,大联盟的订货周期较大时,总运作成本可根据每个零售商持有成本占总持有成本比例进行分摊,反之则平均分摊订购成本,并根据自身需求与持有成本分摊总的持有成本;当考虑零售商订购产品与持有产品的碳排放时,则上述成本分摊规则与平均分摊都不能保持大联盟的稳定,但是通过数值例子表明此时合作博弈的核仍可能非空。
Based on the classical EOQ model, this paper constructs a inventory decision model, in which retailers can joint procurement under carbon-constrained, that aim at the lowest coalition total-costs. Furthermore, we consider two scenarios in which the carbon emission of every time ordering-products for retailers is 0 and the carbon emission of retailers’ holding-products is 0,specifically operation cost allocation rules are designed. Our results show that, firstly, when not consider the carbon emission of every time ordering-products, if the order quantity of the retailer in greatest need is small, the total operation-costs can be allocated in line with the ratio that each retailer’s holding costs accounts for total holding costs. Conversely, with bigger order quantity, the retailers in greatest need shares the ordering costs and own holding costs, and the other retailers share holding costs.Secondly, when not consider the carbon emission of holding-products for retailers, if the order cycle of the grand coalition is long, the total operation-costs can be allocated according to the ratio that each retailer’s holding costs accounts for total holding costs. On the contrary, with less order cycle of the grand coalition, the ordering costs have allocated equally, and the total holding costs would be distributed on the basis of their own needs and holding costs. Lastly, when consider the carbon emission of every time ordering-products and holding-products for retailers, the grand coalition is not stability with the above-mentioned cost allocation rules and average allocation. Otherwise, the numerical examples show the core of cooperative game may be nonempty.
作者
肖旦
罗颜
XIAO Dan;LUO Yan(School of Management,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2023年第3期1-6,共6页
Logistics Sci-Tech
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71802064)
广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2018A030313760)
广州市社科规划一般项目(2018GZYB123)。
关键词
碳排放约束
联合采购联盟
库存策略
稳定性
carbon-constrained
joint purchasing coalitions
inventory strategy
stability
