摘要
考虑消费者参考质量影响的基础上,建立了一个垄断厂商关于产品创新和工艺创新的动态控制模型,其中,产品的需求不仅依赖于价格和质量,还与消费者的参考质量有关。采用最优控制理论分别对厂商实现利润最大化以及政府实现社会福利最大化两种情况下厂商的创新投入决策问题进行研究,并通过数据模拟比较分析了稳态均衡附近两种创新投入和产品价格随时间变化的路径。结果表明:两种情形下分别存在一个唯一的鞍点稳态均衡;两种投入的变化率随参考质量的增加而增加,而稳态投入则随之下降;在其他参数不变的情况下,随着记忆参数的减小,厂商将增加对产品创新的稳态投入;厂商对两种创新投入的社会激励均高于私人激励。
Based on the consideration of the influence of consumer reference quality, a dynamic control model of product innovation and process innovation of a monopoly firm is established, in which, the demand function depends not only on the price and quality, but also on the reference quality of consumers. The optimal control theory is used to study the innovation input decision-making of the monopoly firm in the case of profit maximization and government in the case of social welfare maximization, and the paths of innovation input and product price change with time near steady-state equilibrium are compared and analyzed by data simulation. The results show that there is a unique saddle point steady-state equilibrium in the two cases. The rate of change of the two inputs increases with the increase of the reference mass, but the steady-state input decreases accordingly. When other parameters remain unchanged, the monopoly firm will increase steady-state input to product innovation with the decrease of memory parameters. The social incentives of the monopoly firm to the two kinds of innovation are higher than the private incentives.
作者
李寿德
LI Shoude(Antai School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第1期101-110,共10页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家社会科学规划项目(20BJY109)。
关键词
产品创新
工艺创新
参考质量
product innovation
process innovation
reference quality
