摘要
申报标准的科学设定是经营者集中控制制度的关键。本文通过构建“监管误差成本最小化”理论模型,识别了经营者集中申报标准的影响因素及方向,提出经营者集中最优申报标准是由多种因素共同决定的,其中,经营者总体规模、反垄断执法机构审查成本、交易当事方申报成本与最优申报标准正相关,反竞争案件比例、反竞争案件的竞争损害程度与最优申报标准负相关。拓展研究表明,随着简易申报机制的引入、反垄断执法资源的增加、反垄断执法机构执法能力和水平的提高,申报标准可适度降低。本文提出了营业额申报标准的估计思路,在对核心参数值校准的基础上,测算了中国最优营业额申报标准,并对现行和拟修订申报标准的合理性进行了评估,发现中国现行申报标准已经过高,现阶段不宜进一步提高,可以考虑将2008年制定的过高申报标准恢复至正常水平。本文认为,应建立有效的经营者集中申报标准动态调整机制。
Rationally setting the notification thresholds is the key to the system of controlling concentration of undertakings. The latest Provisions of the State Council on the Notification Thresholds of Concentration of Undertakings(Revision Draft for Comments)issued on June 2022 has greatly raised the current turnover notification thresholds,its rationality still needs further discussion. This paper mainly explores how to identify the factors affecting the notification thresholds of concentration of undertakings and how to set the thresholds.The rationally setting of the notification thresholds needs to balance relevant costs. Easterbrook(1984)put forward a theory of minimizing law enforcement error costs,which provides insight into the setting of the notification thresholds. Based on its core ideas,this paper introduces the concept of regulatory error in the design of mandatory notification mechanism of concentration of undertakings,expounds the sources and forms of two types of regulatory error costs,and identifies the influencing factors by constructing the theoretical model of regulatory error cost minimization. This paper proposes that the optimal notification thresholds is determined by a variety of factors,among which the size of undertakings,the review cost,and the notification cost are positively correlated with the optimal notification thresholds,the proportion and the damage of anti-competitive transaction are negatively correlated with the optimal notification thresholds. With the introduction of simplified procedure,increase in law enforcement resources,and improvement of law enforcement ability and level,the thresholds can be moderately lowered. This paper further put forward the idea of evaluating the rationality of the current and proposed revision thresholds based on estimation results. We argue that the notification thresholds formulated in2008 in China is too high.This paper has made some progress in the following three aspects. Firstly,previous studies on the factors affecting the notification thresh
作者
于左
魏昕
YU Zuo;WEI Xin(Center for Industrial and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第11期78-96,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金重大项目“数字经济反垄断理论与政策研究”(批准号72192842)。
关键词
经营者集中
申报标准
误差成本最小化
反垄断
concentration of undertakings
notification thresholds
error-cost minimization
antitrust
