摘要
随着环境问题日益严峻,各国开始广泛聚焦环境问题,倡导低碳经济。文章在碳限额与交易规制下,基于由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链,构建集中决策、制造商理性偏好分散决策以及制造商损失厌恶分散决策三种博弈模型,探究制造商损失厌恶倾向对产品减排率、定价以及成员利润的影响,并针对利润损失,设计协调契约。最后通过数值仿真,检验主要命题。结果表明:(1)制造商损失厌恶倾向不利于供应链减排,且对零售商利润的损害显著高于对自身利润的损害。(2)损失厌恶水平较低的制造商倾向于提高批发价格,而损失厌恶水平较高则相反。(3)针对制造商损失厌恶倾向造成的利润损失,实施减排成本共担契约,并合理配置成本分担比例,可以实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。
With the increasingly serious environmental problems,countries begin to focus on environmental problems and advocate low-carbon economy.Based on the two-level supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer,this paper constructs three game models of centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making of rational preference of manufacturers and decentralized decision-making of loss aversion of manufacturers,and explores the influence of loss aversion tendency of manufacturers on product emission reduction rate,pricing and member profits.And for profit loss,design a coordination contract.Finally,the main propositions are tested by numerical simulation.The results show that:(1)The loss aversion tendency of manufacturers is not conducive to supply chain emission reduction,and will harm the interests of supply chain members.(2)The loss aversion degree of manufacturers will have a significant impact on their pricing strategies.(3)According to the profit loss caused by manufacturers’loss aversion tendency,the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’profit can be achieved by implementing the emission reduction cost sharing contract and reasonably allocating the cost sharing ratio.
作者
王红春
宁旭
WANG Hong-chun;NING Xu(School of Urban Economic and Management,Beijing Univevsity of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Beijing 100044)
出处
《供应链管理》
2022年第10期21-32,共12页
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
基金
国家自然科学基金“基于网络理论的城市物流供应链协同调控研究”(61772062)。
关键词
碳限额与碳交易
斯塔克尔伯格博弈
损失厌恶
供应链减排
carbon quota and carbon trading
Stackelberg game
loss aversion
supply chain emission reduction
