摘要
业绩预告是重要的会计信息之一,影响资本市场投资者的价值判断,逐渐成为管理层谋求个人利益最大化的工具。中国股权集中程度较高,第二类代理问题更为突出,控股股东在利益驱动下有能力与管理层合谋,影响业绩预告的披露。但控股股东的利益侵占动机及其行为难以直接识别,近几年流行的控股股东股权质押业务为此提供了研究视角。基于第二类代理问题,以2005年至2019年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,采用Logit、有序Logit和OLS等多元回归分析方法,实证检验控股股东股权质押与业绩预告策略性披露之间的关系,并分析产权性质、董事会结构、股市周期和控制权转移风险对上述关系的调节作用,在此基础上从股票收益率和股权资本成本两个方面进一步分析业绩预告策略性披露的长短期效应。研究结果表明,控股股东股权质押前,积极业绩预告的披露概率更高,但股权质押降低了积极业绩预告的精确度和准确性,提高了乐观偏差;控股股东股权质押当年,积极业绩预告的披露频率更高。在控制内生性问题和政策变化后,基本结果依然稳健。进一步研究发现,非国有公司的控股股东在股权质押前更有可能披露积极的业绩预告;董事会结构和股市周期对质押前积极业绩预告的披露概率没有影响;质押后控制权转移风险越大,上市公司披露积极业绩预告的概率越大。短期内,积极业绩预告可助推股价上升,有利于控股股东高位质押,但长期看质押削弱了积极业绩预告对股权资本成本的降低作用。研究结果为控股股东利用信息披露进行市值管理提供了进一步证据,丰富了业绩预告披露的影响因素研究,拓展了交易驱动信息管理的研究成果。实践意义上,对上市公司优化治理结构、中小投资者全面理解业绩预告、监管部门加强信息披露监管具有一定的启示意义。
Earnings forecast is one of the important accounting information, which affects the value judgment of investors in the capital market and has gradually become a tool for management to maximize personal interests. In China, the degree of equity concentration is relatively high, and the type II agency problem is more prominent. Driven by interests, controlling shareholders have the ability to collude with the management to influence earnings forecast disclosure. However, it is difficult to directly identify the motives and behaviors of controlling shareholders′ expropriation. Therefore, the popular pledge business of controlling shareholders in recent years provides a research perspective.Based on the type II agency problem, this study takes Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from2005 to 2019 as research samples and uses multiple regression analysis methods such as logit, ordered logit, and OLS, etc. to empirically test the relationship between controlling shareholders′ stock pledge and strategic disclosure of earnings forecast.Furthermore, this study analyzes the moderating effects on the above relationship from property rights, board structure, stock market cycle, and the risk of control transfer. On this basis, the long-term and short-term effects of earnings forecast′ strategic disclosure are also explored from the perspectives of stock return and the cost of equity capital.The results show that listed companies are prone to releasing positive earnings forecast before controlling shareholders′stock pledge, yet the precision and accuracy of positive earnings forecast are less, and optimistic bias is more;the frequency of this disclosure is higher during the stock pledge year. The basic results remain robust after endogenous problems and policy change are controlled. Further research indicates that non-state-owned enterprises′ controlling shareholders are more likely to disclose positive earnings forecast before the stock pledge;the board structure and stock market cycle have no e
作者
张军华
ZHANG Junhua(Accounting School,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046,China)
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期101-115,共15页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家社会科学基金(19AGL011)
河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2018BJJ009)
河南省软科学研究计划项目(222400410616)。
关键词
控股股东股权质押
业绩预告
策略性披露
精确度
准确性
controlling shareholders′stock pledge
earnings forecast
strategic disclosure
precision
accuracy
