摘要
为了更深刻地了解系统故障演化过程(System Fault Evolution Process,SFEP)中事件故障状态受管理者和操作者安全和不安全行为的影响,基于量子博弈模型提出了单一事件故障状态量子博弈模型,并对管理者和操作者的收益情况进行了研究。首先论述了利用量子博弈研究单一事件故障状态的可行性并提出假设;其次研究了管理者和操作者在博弈后的期望收益;最后探讨了管理者和操作者混合策略中各行为的实施概率,得到了针对事件故障状态变化的量子博弈模型。结果表明该博弈一般是非对称博弈。管理者采取安全行为且操作者采取不安全行为对双方收益的影响最大;操作者选择安全行为的概率越大,管理者越有利;管理者选择安全行为的概率越大,操作者越有利;确定了双方采取混合策略时各自的期望收益;最后通过实例说明了模型的使用方法。该混合策略具有纳什均衡非博弈演化稳定性,可应用于空间故障网络(Space Fault Network,SFN)的系统故障状态量子博弈分析。
To deeply understand the safety and unsafe behaviors of the managers and operators that have an impact on the event fault state in the system fault evolution process(SFEP),a single event fault state quantum game model is proposed based on the quantum game model and the benefits of managers and operators are studied.Firstly,the feasibility of using the quantum game to study a single event fault state is discussed and the hypothesis is put forward.Secondly,the expected income of managers and operators after the game is studied.Finally,the implementation probability of each behavior in the hybrid strategy of manager and operator is studied and a quantum game model for the change of event fault state is obtained.The results show when the participants who affect the single event fault state and their behaviors are set,generally speaking,for the event fault state,the participants’income is an asymmetric game.The state of the quantum event is transformed into the behavior of the participants.The initial state is determined by the factor decomposition method,and the expected return of mixed strategy of manager and operator in the game process is obtained.When the manager takes safe behavior and the operator takes unsafe behavior,it has the greatest impact on the income of both sides;the greater the probability of the operator takes safe behavior,the more income the manager is;the greater the probability of the manager takes safe behavior,the more income the operator is.The strategy probabilities of managers and operators are determined.The partial derivative of the expected profit of managers and operators is obtained to obtain the probability of both sides taking safe and unsafe behaviors.The expected incomes of the two sides are obtained when they adopt the hybrid strategy.Finally,an example is given to illustrate the use of the model.The hybrid strategy is a Nash equilibrium non-game evolutionary stability strategy,which can be applied to the quantum game analysis of system fault state in space fault network(SFN).
作者
李莎莎
崔铁军
LI Sha-sha;CUI Tie-jun(School of Business Administration,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao 125105,Liaoning,China;College of Safety Science and Engineering,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao 125105,Liaoning,China)
出处
《安全与环境学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第4期1715-1721,共7页
Journal of Safety and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(52004120)
辽宁省教育厅科学研究经费项目(LJ2020QNL018)
辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目(LJKQZ2021157)
辽宁工程技术大学学科创新团队项目(LNTU20TD-31)。
