摘要
针对两种典型的电商扶贫供应链融资模式——银行融资和电商融资,构建扶贫供应链的博弈模型,分析不同融资模式的运作机理,提出农户和电商对于不同融资模式的偏好条件。研究表明:若银行与电商的期望利率相差较大,当农户风险规避程度较高时,选择电商融资模式可以实现农户和电商的双赢,此时,电商应提供融资服务,当农户风险规避程度较低时,选择银行融资模式可以实现农户和电商的双赢;若银行与电商的期望利率相差较小,选择电商融资模式可以实现农户和电商的双赢;随着电商社会责任感增强,农户将更加偏好银行融资模式。
For two typical supply chain financing modes for poverty alleviation through“bank financing”and“e-commerce financing”,this study constructs a game model for poverty alleviation supply chain,analyzes the operation mechanism of different financing modes,and proposes the preference conditions of farmers and e-commerce for different financing modes.The analysis results reveal that when there is a large difference between the expected interest rate of the bank and e-commerce,and the farmer’s degree of risk-averse is relatively high,farmers and e-commerce can realize a win-win situation only through the“e-commerce financing”mode,at this time,the e-commerce should provide financing services.And when the farmer’s degree of risk-averse is relatively low,farmers and e-commerce can realize a win-win situation only through the“bank financing”mode.When there is a little difference between the expected interest rate of the bank and e-commerce,farmers and e-commerce can realize a win-win situation through the“e-commerce financing”mode.What’s more,farmers are more likely to choose the“bank financing”mode to realize a win-win situation with the increased social responsibility of the e-commerce.
作者
浦徐进
王艺苗
徐磊
PU Xujin;WANG Yimiao;XU Lei(Jiangnan University,Wuxi,Jiangsu,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第8期1223-1230,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(20&ZD117)。
关键词
电商扶贫
社会责任
农产品供应链金融
风险厌恶
e-commerce poverty alleviation
social responsibility
agricultural product supply chain finance
risk-averse
