摘要
立足于反腐倡廉和降低制度性交易成本的政策背景与目标,本文以2013年中组部印发的《关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见》(中组发18号文件)这一外生反腐政策为研究契机,使用PSM-DID方法检验反腐政策“18号文”引发的官员独立董事辞职对企业制度性交易成本的长期影响,并进一步区分产权性质展开研究。研究发现,反腐政策能够显著降低企业制度性交易成本,主要体现为税费成本、股权融资成本、行政审批成本和社会保险成本下降。且相较于非国有企业,国有企业的社会保险成本降低幅度更大。文章证实反腐活动有利于实现供给侧改革的降成本目标,“反腐影响经济发展”是一个伪命题。
Based on the policy background and objectives of anti-corruption and reducing the institutional transaction costs, this paper takes the exogenous policy event as the research opportunity, which is “the opinions on further regulating the issue of party and government leading cadres holding part-time(full-time) positions in enterprises” issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CPC) in 2013. We use the PSM-DID approach to study the long-term impacts of the resignation of official independent directors on the institutional transaction costs, and further distinguish the nature of property rights. It is found that the anti-corruption policy can significantly reduce the institutional transaction costs of companies, which are mainly reflected in the decrease of tax costs, equity financing costs, administrative approval costs and social insurance costs. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the social insurance costs of state-owned enterprises are reduced by a greater margin. Therefore, it proves that anti-corruption activities are contributed to realizing the goal of reducing costs in supply-side reform, and that “anti-corruption affects economic development” is a pseudo-proposition.
作者
高燕燕
罗朱红
GAO Yan-yan;LUO Zhu-hong(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221000,China)
出处
《系统工程》
北大核心
2022年第4期29-40,共12页
Systems Engineering
基金
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(18YJC630037)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(18BGL068)。
关键词
制度性交易成本
独董辞职
反腐政策“18号文”
Institutional Transaction Costs
Resignation of Independent Directors
Anti-corruption Policy“No.18 Document”
