摘要
本文将派驻督察政策与绩效考核指标转变纳入统一分析框架内,利用多任务委托代理模型分析了“质量”任务和“数量”任务冲突情形下的最优策略选择,并以国家土地督察为例,采用双重差分的方法进行实证检验。研究结果表明:派驻督察政策有助于推动高质量发展,但其实施要充分考虑任务的相对冲突性;在双代理人模式下,土地派驻督察政策能够显著发挥其监督激励的作用,可以通过影响地方政府来推动高质量发展;转变绩效考核指标这类引导型激励方式发挥的效果开始初步显现。机制检验表明,督察政策推动高质量发展是通过促进法制规范性、发展集约性、环境可持续性和民生共享性等方面实现的。
In this paper,the stationed supervision policy and the transformation of performance appraisal are brought into the unified analysis framework,and the multi task principal-agent model is used to analyze the optimal strategy choice under the conflict between“quality”tasks and“quantity”tasks.In terms of empirical research,this paper takes the stationed land supervision policy as an example,uses the method of difference-in-difference to empirically test the impact of the policy on high-quality economic development and the mechanism of action.The results show that the inspectorate policy helps to promote high-quality development,but its implementation should take into account the relative conflict between tasks;under the two-agent model,the land stationed supervision policy can significantly play its role of supervision and incentive,and can promote high-quality development by influencing the local government;the effect of such guiding incentive methods as changing performance appraisal indicators began to show initially.The mechanism test shows that the supervision policy promotes high-quality development by promoting the standardization of the legal system,intensive development,environmental sustainability and people’s livelihood sharing.
作者
赵绪帅
郑丽芳
郭广珍
ZHAO Xushuai;ZHENG Lifang;GUO Guangzhen(School of Economics,Liaoning University;National Economics Research Center,Guangdong University of Finance&Economics)
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第7期82-99,共18页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
辽宁省“兴辽英才计划”项目“辽宁省经济高质量发展体系研究”(批准号XLYC1907192)
中国共产党广东省第十三次代表大会精神专题研究项目“广东省房地产发展与土地财政潜在风险研究”的资助。
关键词
土地督察
绩效考核
高质量发展
委托代理
land inspector
performance appraisal
high-quality development
principal-agent
