摘要
近年来,随着社会保险基金规模的不断扩大,有关社会保险基金的监督问题也愈发凸显,尤其是在社会保险基金的给付环节,由于违法成本低,导致冒领、替领的案件时有发生。基于演化博弈理论,对监管者与领取者进行博弈分析,并提出相关策略,以保证社会保险基金的安全性,确保社会保障制度以及社会经济发展的平稳运行。
In recent years,with the continuous expansion of the social insurance fund scale,the supervision of the social insurance fund is becoming more and more obvious,especially in the social insurance fund payment link,because of the low illegal cost,resulting in impostor events happen from time to time.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper analyzes the game between regulators and recipients,and proposes relevant strategies to ensure the security of social insurance fund and the smooth operation of social security system and social economic development.
作者
宋成志
SONG Cheng-zhi(School of Economics,Changchun University,Changchun 130022,China)
出处
《长春金融高等专科学校学报》
2022年第4期33-39,共7页
Journal of Changchun Finance College
关键词
社保基金
演化博弈
给付环节
social security fund
evolutionary game
payment link
