摘要
本文围绕存款保险制度实现早期纠正功能的边界是什么,中国存款保险制度是否实现早期纠正功能以及如何更好地实现存款保险制度的早期纠正功能三个方面的问题展开研究。研究结果表明,当投保银行与监管者的博弈处于分离均衡状态时,存款保险制度能够实现早期纠正功能。然而,当高风险承担银行通过修饰财务指标规避监管时,该行为导致的混同均衡状态会降低存款保险制度有效性。中国自2017年起开展的早期纠正实践虽能抑制银行被动风险承担行为,但却促使银行主动承担更多风险,说明该实践正处于准分离均衡状态,存款保险早期纠正功能并非完全有效。通过提高监管效率和降低早期纠正措施的监管成本,能够收紧混同均衡的条件区间,从而更好地实现存款保险制度的早期纠正功能。
This paper studies the boundary conditions for the deposit insurance system to achieve prompt corrective function by constructing a signaling game model for banks decision making and regulators’intervention.This paper selected data from 95 banks in China from 2014 to 2019 and used 3SLS method to examine the influence of prompt corrective function on bank risk behavior and test whether deposit insurance system in China has achieved prompt corrective functions.Whether the deposit insurance system realizes the prompt corrective function is of great realistic significance in improving the effectiveness of bank supervision and maintaining financial security.This paper answers how to better implement the prompt correction function of deposit insurance from the perspective of regulators.The results show the deposit insurance system can achieve the prompt corrective function when the game is located in a state of separation and equilibrium between the insured bank and the regulator.However,when high-risk-taking banks circumvent regulatory intervention by modifying financial indicators,the resulting mixed equilibrium reduces the effectiveness of the deposit insurance system.Although the prompt corrective practice carried out in China can inhibit the passive risk-taking behavior of banks since 2017,it has prompted banks to take the initiative to take on more risks which shows it is in a quasiseparation equilibrium and the prompt corrective function of deposit insurance is not fully effective.By improving regulatory efficiency and reducing regulatory costs for prompt corrective action to lower the threshold of regulatory intervention,the prompt corrective function of deposit insurance can be more efficient.In summary,this paper puts forward three suggestions in order to play the prompt correction function of deposit insurance in China effectively.First of all,the government should identify the major risks in hidden danger of insured banks in time and improve the effectiveness of the deposit insurance system.Secondly,the g
作者
宋美霖
张屹山
杨成荣
Song Meilin;Zhang Yishan;Yang Chengrong(Center for Quantitative Economics,Jilin University)
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期57-66,共10页
Studies of International Finance
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“新时期中国经济长期稳定增长的潜力与实现路径研究”(17JJD790009)资助。
关键词
早期纠正
存款保险
监管干预
银行风险承担
Prompt Corrective Action
Deposit Insurance System
Regulatory Intervention
Bank Risk-Taking
