摘要
以《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》(2010)以及各省份国资委颁布的相关文件中将研发投入视为利润为切入点,考察其对经济附加值(economic value added,EVA)的影响。以此为准自然实验,选用多期双重差分进行验证,结果表明:第一,研发投入视为利润考核政策显著提升国有企业绩效,经过一系列检验结果依旧稳健,其中高管薪酬激励起着中介作用;第二,分组检验发现,相比于非竞争性国有企业,竞争性国有企业业绩的提升效果更为明显;第三,资本密集型国有企业对于研发投入视为利润考核政策更敏感。研究结论为继续推动研发投入视为利润考核政策提供理论支撑。
Executive performance evaluationis an important system to optimize the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.“R&D investment as profit”,this innovation of executive performance evaluation system,is of great significance to the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.“R&D investment as profit”in the Assessment Measuresis taken as the entry point to investigate its impact on Economic Value Added(EVA).Based on this,time-varying difference in differences(DID)method is used to test the quasi-experiment.The results show that:(1)The evaluation systemof“R&D investment as profit”significantly improves the performance of state-owned enterprises,and the results are still stable after a series of tests,among which executive compensation incentive plays a mediating role;(2)Compared with non-competitive state-owned enterprises,performance improvement of competitive state-owned enterprises is more obvious.Capital-intensive state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to the“R&D investment as profit”evaluation system.The conclusion can provide theoretical support for the continued promotion of“R&D investment as profit”evaluation system.
作者
杨兰品
梅雨
胡凯
YANG Lanpin;MEI Yu;HU Kai(Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430000, China;South-Central MinzuUniversity, Wuhan 430000, China)
出处
《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》
2022年第3期90-105,共16页
Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18BJL048)。
关键词
业绩考核
“研发投入视为利润”政策
高管激励
双重差分
performance evaluation
“R&D investment as profit”system
executive incentive
difference in differences
