摘要
交易所进行金融创新需要同时处理由治理结构引起的内部目标冲突和由监管授权机制引起的外部目标冲突。本文构建基于金融创新过程性特征的理论模型,在统一框架下比较政府监管和合作监管两种情境下,互助制交易所和非互助制交易所的创新效率。本文根据2006-2016年全球交易所的面板数据,实证检验交易所的去互助化程度和市场监管权限对其衍生品创新数量的影响。理论模型表明,创新远期利益约束是交易所在合作监管下主动调和-提高创新收益和控制创新风险这对外部目标冲突的前提。当交易所为互助制,且内部利益冲突过高时,创新远期利益约束失效,政府收回监管权限并导致创新延迟;当交易所为非互助制,能有效缓解创新决策过程中的内部冲突,并维持政府和交易所的合作监管均衡,提高金融创新效率。实证结果表明,交易所的内外部治理机制共同影响金融创新效率,交易所的去互助化程度越高,同时在合作监管下交易所的市场监管权限越大,金融创新数量越多,理论模型假说得到证实。
The exchange-led financial innovation mainly includes innovations in trading products,technology,channels,and risk control mechanisms,which are significant for improving the market information efficiency and alleviating the sharp rise and fall of stock price.The governance mechanism of the exchange affects the efficiency of innovation.For one thing,the internal governance structure determines the decision-making approaches adopted by the exchange when dealing with objective conflicts between members as well as between members and shareholders,thus affecting the efficiency of obtaining the resource for innovation and the decision-making efficiency of innovation.For another,the external regulatory power allocation affects the exchange′s incentive compatibility between the external goals of obtaining innovation gains and protecting the interests of investors by influencing the innovation approval time and the efficiency of regulation adjustment.Therefore,in the process of financial innovation,the exchange needs to deal with both internal target conflicts caused by governance structure and external target conflicts caused by regulatory power allocation.Existing research separates the influence of dual governance mechanisms on innovation and carries out theoretical analysis only on a single dimension,and there is also lack of empirical research on such problems.To fill this gap,this paper compares the innovation performance of mutual and demutualized exchanges under government and cooperative regulations in a unified framework,and empirically tests the analysis results of the theoretical model.Arguably,this paper can explain how governance mechanisms influence financial innovation more reasonably and provide corresponding theoretical support for optimizing the governance mechanism of China′s exchanges.This paper constructs a game model to analyze the innovation decision-making of the exchange under the framework of unifying the internal governance structure and external regulatory authorization mechanism.The model
作者
李佳岚
万迪昉
陈楠
LI Jialan;WAN Difang;CHEN Nan(School of Management,Xi′an Jiaotong University,Xi′an 710049,China;School of Management,Zhejiang Shuren University,Hangzhou 310015,China;Tepper School of Business,Carnegie Mellon University,Pittsburgh 15106,USA)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第4期1-13,共13页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373202、71671138)。
关键词
交易所
金融创新
治理结构
政府监管
合作监管
Exchange
Financial innovation
Governance structure
Government regulation
Cooperative regulation
