基于演化博弈的区域大气污染联防联控生态补偿机制分析——以京津冀地区为例被引量：4

Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Regional Air Pollution Joint Prevention and Control Based on Evolutionary Game Theory:A Case Study of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region

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摘要为促进建立有效的生态补偿机制为协调区域大气污染联防联控各方主体利益提供保障,依托演化博弈模型,通过分析影响区域联防联控策略的各利益参数的相互关系与作用,探讨中央政府与地方政府两大博弈主体的策略选择与演化方向,并以京津冀地区为例进行仿真验证,继而运用系统动力学模型模拟主要利益参数对博弈系统均衡结果的影响。结果表明,中央政府补偿政策的实施直接影响京津冀地方政府联防联控的执行决策,可通过有效分配补偿金额、减轻地方政府联防联控成本、提高监管效率以及加强地方政府执行政策不积极的惩罚力度等措施,促进地方政府采取大气污染联防联控策略以高效推进治理进程。 In order to promote the establishment of an effective ecological compensation mechanism and provide guarantee for coordinating the main interests of all parties in the regional joint prevention and control of air pollution,this paper uses the evolutionary game model to analyze the interrelationships and effects of various benefit parameters that affect regional joint prevention and control strategies,discusses the strategic choices and evolution directions of the two major game players,the central government and regional local governments,and the evolution of the game system is verified by simulation by taking the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as an example.Furthermore,the system dynamics model is used to simulate the influence of main benefit parameters on the equilibrium result of the game system.The results show that,the implementation of the central government’s compensation policy directly affects the BeijingTianjin-Hebei local government’s joint prevention and control decisions.At the same time,local governments can be promoted to adopt the strategy of joint prevention and control of air pollution by effectively allocating the amount of compensation,reducing the cost of joint prevention and control of local governments,improving supervision efficiency and strengthening the punishment of local governments for not actively implementing policies,so as to effectively promote the governance process.

作者李云燕代建盛清 Li Yunyan;Dai Jian;Sheng Qing(School of Economy and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China)

机构地区北京工业大学经济与管理学院

出处《科技管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第10期202-210,共9页 Science and Technology Management Research

基金北京市自然科学基金项目“基于门限效应和合作博弈的京津冀大气污染联防联控机制研究”(9192002) 北京市社会科学基金重点项目“京津冀大气环境联建联防联治的成本分担和生态补偿机制研究”(19YJA002)。

关键词生态补偿机制大气污染联防联控演化博弈京津冀地区 ecological compensation mechanism air pollution joint prevention and control evolutionary game Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region