摘要
现有关于A股市场股权质押的研究多为实证分析,但言人人殊,且与海外市场的发现存在不一致.鉴于此,本文在无其它外部融资渠道的假设下,通过分析股权质押与内部占用两种融资方式的替代效应与潜在风险,提出了一个探讨上市公司控股股东股权质押的动机与经济后果的理论分析框架.除兼容解释已有大部分实证发现之外,我们还证明:1)股权质押可提高控股股东的投资效率并降低其内部占用动机,从而缓解上市公司的代理问题,提升公司估值,增进投资者和社会整体的福利;2)随着质押比例的上升,控股股东的内部占用动机增强,致使公司估值下降,其行为也会随之改变;3)在此过程中,利率、质押率与市场估值的作用正负相异.拓展分析发现:4)股份减持是相对成本最高的融资方式,传递的信号也最负面.总之,股权质押拓展了控股股东的融资渠道,并对上市公司的代理问题、估值以及决策等产生了非线性非单调的影响;其中质押比例是关键,质押政策和市场环境等因素也不容忽视.
In recent years,there has been an increasing amount of literature on controlling shareholders’ share pledging(CSSP) in China,while empirical results are conflicting and inconsistent with those focused on overseas markets.Given that,this study presents a theoretical model to explore the mechanisms and economic consequences of CSSP.In addition to integrating most of the known empirical findings,we find that:1) CSSP could mitigate agency problems,leading to a risen valuation of the firm;meanwhile,it could partly solve the under-investment problem caused by internal financing,then the controlling shareholder would be better off,as well as the investors and the society as a whole;2) however,after pledging all(or most of) the shares,the controlling shareholder resorts to expropriation,thereupon the stock price falls and becomes more volatile,and the corporate decisions could also be affected;3) compared with expropriation and share pledging,share reduction has the highest cost and is the last way the controlling shareholder would choose.In all,our work implies that CSSP is not universally better or worse.It exerts nonlinear and nonmonotonic influence on controlling shareholders ’ expropriation incentives,firms ’ valuation,and decisions,where the pledging ratio plays a pivotal role.
作者
汪先珍
马成虎
WANG Xianzhen;MA Chenghu(School of Management,Pudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第5期1146-1171,共26页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(72033003)。
关键词
控股股东
股权质押
代理问题
经济后果
外部融资
controlling shareholders
share pledging
agency problems
economic consequences
external financing
