摘要
本文基于激励相容机制,构建政府部门与基金管理人的演化博弈模型,对基金管理决策的选择进行稳定性和仿真分析。研究表明:(1)政府部门管理决策会影响基金管理人的努力程度,进而影响产业引导基金的运行效率;(2)努力工作的成本会影响基金管理人的工作态度,“过程激励”与“结果奖励”结合的效果更佳;(3)政府部门单一的管理约束不具有长期性,“差异化奖励”对基金管理人来说更具有推动性。建议引入第三方机构对基金管理人进行考评和监督,综合构建弹性激励机制、长效监管问责机制、成本补偿机制,从而提升基金运行效率。
Based on incentive compatibility mechanism,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government departments and fund managers and conducts stability and simulation analysis on the choice of fund management decisions.The research shows that:(1)the management decision of government departments affects the degree of effort of fund managers,which in turn affects the operating efficiency of industrial guidance funds;(2)the cost of hard work affects the working attitude of fund managers,and the combination of’process incentive’and’result reward’is more effective;(3)the single management constraint of government departments is not long-term,and’differentiated incentive’is more motivating for fund managers.It is suggested to introduce third-party institutions to evaluate and supervise fund managers,and to comprehensively build a flexible incentive mechanism,a long-term regulatory accountability mechanism,and a cost compensation mechanism,to improve the efficiency of fund operation.
作者
唐雨虹
张楠
吴东举
Tang Yuhong;Zhang Nan;Wu Dongju
出处
《宏观经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期94-105,共12页
Macroeconomics
基金
西藏自治区2021年度科技计划人才与基地项目(XZ202101JD0002F)
西藏大学研究生高水平人才培养计划项目(2019-GSP-S087)
西藏大学硕博士学位点建设项目(00060602)的阶段性成果。
关键词
政府产业引导基金
运行效率
政府部门
基金管理人
演化博弈
Government industry guidance fund
Operating efficiency
Government departments
Fund manager
Evolutionary game
