摘要
一种流行观点认为,转售价格维持(RPM)强迫某些消费者支付更高价格,并导致他们不享受服务也要支付高价的不公平结果,因此应推定RPM损害消费者的选择权益并进而推定RPM损害竞争。然而,这一观点以不切实际的理想状态作为评判RPM的基准。大多数情况下,RPM都只不过是生产商用以处理搭便车、激励不兼容等商业经营障碍的正当手段而已,禁止生产商实施RPM根本不会给消费者带来更大的选择自由和公平,反而会带来一系列商业问题。只有当生产商拥有实质性市场势力时,RPM才真正有可能损害消费者选择权益,充分的品牌间竞争足以保障消费者选择自由与公平目标的实现。但RPM的实施并不以生产商拥有实质性市场势力为前提。因此,我们不能轻率地推定RPM损害消费者选择权益。
A popular view opines that resale price maintenance(RPM)forces some consumers to pay higher prices and causes the unfair result of those consumers paying high prices event not consuming services,which supports a presumption that RPM injures consumer’s choice interests and thereby causes competitive harm.However,this reasoning falls to the nirvada fallacy by using an unrealistic ideal norm as the benchmark for judging RPM.In most cases,RPMs are simply legitimate means for manufacturers to deal with such commercial obstacles as free-riding or incentive incompatibility.In such circumstances,prohibiting RPM will not bring more choice freedom or fairness to consumers,but causing a series of commercial problems.Only where a manufacturer possesses substantial market power,may its RPM practices injure consumer choice.Sufficient inter-brand competition guarantees the realization of the consumer choice freedom and fairness.However,substantial monopoly power is not the condition precedent to manufactures engaging in RPM.Therefore,we may not recklessly presume that RPM injures consumer choice.
出处
《南大法学》
CSSCI
2022年第2期18-35,共18页
NanJing University Law Journal
关键词
垄断协议
转售价格维持
消费者选择
竞争损害
搭便车
激励不兼容
Monopolistic Agreement
Resale Price Maintenance(RPM)
Consumer Choice
Competitive Harm
Free-Riding
Incentive Incompatibility
