摘要
融资难是长期以来中小企业发展的瓶颈,对创新型中小企业发展的约束尤其明显。建立一个动态多期模型,分析债务结构和展期风险对创新型中小企业研发创新行为的影响。首先,采用泊松学习来模型化企业的创新过程,市场对企业盈利能力的信念随每期的研发结果而改变,并据此决定企业的融资成本。其次,企业每期选择展期债务并继续研发或者债务违约同时停止研发。结果显示:由于融资成本随着企业违约概率的提高而提高,展期风险与违约行为之间会相互加强。这一“恶性循环”导致企业在项目的社会价值大于零时就结束研发,也即竞争性均衡是没有效率的。最后,进一步讨论了如何采用长期融资策略以化解展期风险,提高资源配置的效率。
This paper utilizes a dynamic model to investigate a firm s R&D decision under rollover risk.The R&D process is modeled as a Poisson bandit,and in each period,firm s R&D outcome changes market s belief about the firm s profitability,which further determines the firm s financial costs.Faced by the financial costs,the firm can either rollover the debt by paying the financial costs and continue R&D or default the debt and terminate R&D.It turns out that the financial costs increase with the firm s probability of default.As a result,there is a reinforcement effect between rollover risk and firm s decision to default,which leads to an inefficient competitive equilibrium:R&D is terminated too early as the social value of the project is still larger than zero.Using method of guess and verify,we explicitly characterize the value functions of both the firm and the social planner.Interestingly,the social planner s optimal value is continuous in market s belief about the firm s profitability;While the firm s optimal value is not and jumps according to the R&D outcome.At last,this paper provides a long-term financing strategy which can be used to deal with the risk of rollover.This long-term financing strategy can effectively eliminate the rollover risk and improve the allocation efficiency.
作者
翁翕
李文健
徐朝阳
WENG Xi;LI Wen-jian;XU Zhao-yang
出处
《产经评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期99-114,共16页
Industrial Economic Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“组织经济学理论与应用”(项目编号:71973002,项目负责人:翁翕)
国家自然科学基金重大项目“数字经济中数据要素有效使用与消费者保护”(项目编号:72192843,项目负责人:乔晗)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“税负归宿与最优税收理论视角下的健全‘初次分配’与‘再分配’调节机制研究”(项目编号:72003198,项目负责人:李文健)。
