摘要
海洋督察是海洋行政主管部门履行行政监督职能的形式。本文运用完全信息静态博弈理论分析海洋督察队伍与地方政府双方博弈关系,分别计算地方政府违法违规与海洋督察队伍监管的收益函数,分析影响海洋督察队伍监管与地方政府违法违规行为决策的主要因素,并根据混合策略纳什均衡求出了均衡点((Fp-Cp)/(Fp-Cp+C),(B2-B1)/Fp)。
The marine inspector is a form in which the marine administrative department performs its administrative supervision functions. This paper analyzes the game relationship between the marine inspector team and the local government by using the complete information static game theory, calculates the income function of the local government’s illegal violations and the supervision of the marine inspector team, and analyzes the main factors affecting the decision of the marine inspector team and the local government’s violation of laws and regulations. The equilibrium point((Fp-Cp)/(Fp-Cp + C),(B2-B1)/Fp) was obtained based on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
作者
翁怡婵
秦晓光
周刚
齐安翔
WENG Yi-chan;QIN Xiao-guang;ZHOU Gang;QI An-xiang(Marine forecast center of east China Sea,SOA,shanghai 200081;East China Sea Aviation Detachment of China Maritime Supervision,SOA,shanghai 200081)
出处
《海洋湖沼通报》
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第1期167-170,共4页
Transactions of Oceanology and Limnology
基金
自然资源部东海局青年科学基金—我国历史用海项目存在的宗海范围问题的解决方法研究(201505)。
关键词
完全信息静态博弈
海洋督察
纳什均衡
complete information static game
marine supervision
Nash equilibrium
