摘要
高新技术企业认定过程中的研发操纵行为对企业自身和社会运行均会产生不利影响,如何管制这种操纵行为成为切实推进创新强国战略的重要问题。党组织通过“双向进入、交叉任职”体系嵌入公司治理结构有助于管制高新技术认证过程中的研发操纵行为,且嵌入程度越大治理效应越好。党组织嵌入董事会和监事会对研发操纵行为的治理作用更好;党组织可作为内外部监督机制的重要补充,当企业所在地税收征管力度弱、媒体关注度低或自身内部监督不力、信息透明度差时,党组织的治理作用更显著。
Research and Development(R&D) manipulation in identification process of high-tech enterprises has a negative impact on both of the enterprise and social operation. How to restrain the manipulation has become a key issue to effectively promote the innovation strategy. Embedding the CPC organization into corporate management structure via the system of “two-way entry and cross-tenure” helps restrain R&D manipulation in high-tech identification process. The greater the embedding degree is, the better governance effect will be.Embedding the CPC organization in the boards of directors and supervisors has a better governance effect on R&D manipulation. Party organization can be an important supplement to internal and external supervision mechanism. Its governance role is more significant when there is weak local tax collection, deficient enterprise administration, low media attention, ineffective internal supervision, or limited information transparency.
作者
于未东
胡耀丹
王稳华
YU Wei-dong;HU Yao-dan;WANG Wen-hua(The Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC/Chinese Academy ofGovernance,Beijing,100089;Accounting School,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming,650221)
出处
《云南社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第2期121-131,共11页
Social Sciences in Yunnan
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目“年报问询监管与上市公司融资行为研究”(项目号:20JYC630043)
云南省科技厅基础研究青年项目“党组织参与公司治理对民营企业投资活动的影响研究”(项目号:“202001AU070057”)的阶段性成果。
