摘要
在委托代理视角下分析了隧道建设项目中建设方、施工方及设计方的价值偏好和行为选择以及多轮博弈后施工方与设计方之间可能存在的隐性契约关系,并在此基础上设计了建设方与施工方的合同激励条款。在多代理人框架内,委托人建设方在合同框架内追求质量、效率与低成本;设计方会考虑建设方的监督不足而偏好于优先考虑设计风险,再考虑委托人期望;施工方在施工过程中更倾向于通过利用得到的设计方行为选择以及围岩状况私人信息获利。以委托代理模型为基础得到对施工方的最佳激励模式:建设方对于额外工期收益只保留一个固定收益水平,施工方获得其余所有收益,固定收益的大小取决于设计方的价值偏好变化。基于委托代理视角得到的隧道建设各参与方的价值偏好与行为选择逻辑有利于提高隧道建设的管理效率,同时得到的针对施工方的合同激励模式可为减少建设方与施工方、设计方的代理风险提供指导。
Based on the principal-agent theory,the value preferences and behavior choices of the owner,the contractor and the designer in the tunnel construction project,and the implicit contract relationship that may exist between the contractor and the designer after multiple rounds of games were analyzed,and on this basis,the contract incentive clauses between the owner and the contractor were designed.In the framework of multi-agents,the owner pursues quality,efficiency and low cost within the framework of the contract;the designer considers the lack of supervision of the owner and prefer to prioritize the design risk,and then consider the client’s expectations;during the construction process,the contractor is more inclined to profit by using the personal information of the designer’s behavior selection and surrounding rock conditions.Based on the principal-agent model to obtain the best incentive model for the construction party:the owner only retains one fixed income level for the extra construction period income,and the builder gets all the remaining income.The size of the fixed income depends on the designer’s value preference change.Based on the principal-agent perspective,the value preferences and behavior selection logic of each participant in tunnel construction is beneficial to improve the management efficiency of tunnel construction.In addition,the contract incentive model obtained for the construction party can provide guidance for reducing the agency risk between the owner and the contractor,the owner and the designer.
作者
史果香
梁育浩
SHI Guoxiang;LIANG Yuhao(Yangquan Branch of Shanxi Highway Bureau,Yangquan 045000,China;China Communications First Survey and Design Institute,Xi’an 710075,China;School of Highway,Chang’an University,Xi’an 710064,China)
出处
《土木工程与管理学报》
2022年第1期100-107,共8页
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
基金
山西省交通科技项目(2017-1-4
2018-1-3)
山西交通控股集团有限公司科技项目(2019-JKKJ-41)。
关键词
隧道工程
钻爆法
施工合同管理
价值偏好
tunnel engineering
drilling and blasting method
construction contract management
value preference
