摘要
供应商(客户)集中度代表企业间关系的强度,关系中私有信息的沟通既降低了公司公开信息披露的动力,又减轻了公司公开信息披露违规的后果。供应商(客户)集中度越高,一方面,企业越容易信息披露违规;另一方面,企业越容易转移违规的负面后果,供应商(客户)集中度有利于缓解违规企业银行贷款“量价齐升”的局面。这两方面的影响损害了资本市场的公平性,不利于投资者保护。通过对中国上市公司的考察,本文提供了上述推测的经验证据。我们根据信息披露权衡理论,从违规动因和违规后果两个角度考察了供应商(客户)对公司信息披露的影响及其作用机理,为证监会对公司供应商(客户)集中度的关注提供了理论依据和证据支持。同时,本文从企业间关系角度补充了制度环境与会计信息质量的相关文献,从投资者保护角度拓展了供应链关系对企业行为影响的研究。
Information disclosure system requires listed enterprises to truthfully,accurately,completely and timely disclose information,so that investors of different groups have the same infor-mation channel,which is the key to prevent securities fraud and protect small and medium investors.As China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)continues to pay attention to supplier(customer)concentration and requires listed enterprises to disclose supplier(cus-tomer)information from the previous voluntary disclosure to the current mandatory dis-closure.For enterprises with a high concentration of suppliers(customers),the mandatory disclosure requirements are more detailed.This may be related to the relationship transaction characteristics of Chinese enterprises.Supplier(customer)concentration represents the strength of the relationship between enter-prises.The communication of private information in the relationship may not only reduce the motivation of the enterprise to disclose information,but also reduce the consequences of the disclosure violations.Based on the trade-off theory of information disclosure,we investigate the influence of suppliers(customers)on enterprise information disclosure and its mechanism from the perspectives of motivation and consequence of violations.We find that the higher the concentration of suppliers(customers)is,the easier enterprises will violate in the information disclosure.The higher the concentration of suppliers(customers)is,the easier it is for en-terprises to transfer the negative conse-quences of violation;the concentration of suppliers(customers)is conducive to alleviating the situation of simultaneous increase of quantity and price of bank loans of illegal enterprises.The influence of these two aspects damages the fairness of the capital market and goes against the protection of investors.Our research shows that the requirement of mandatory information disclosure protects investors’basic right to know and is conducive to reducing the information gap between investors of different grou
作者
陈西婵
刘星
Chen Xichan;Liu Xing(Dongwu Business School,Soochow University;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期213-224,I0041,I0042,共14页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004)
国家自然科学基金项目(J1824102、71772131)资助。
关键词
供应商(客户)集中度
信息披露违规
银行贷款
投资者保护
Supplier(Customer)Concentration
Information Disclosure Violation
Bank Loans
Investor Protection
