优化营商环境与抑制民营企业高管职务消费实证研究被引量：10

The Empirical Research on Business Environment Improvement Restraining Non-pecuniary Compensation in Private Companies

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摘要优化营商环境能够通过降低代理成本和维系良好政企关系进而有效抑制民营企业高管职务消费,这一论点尚未得到学术界的关注。笔者以2009—2019年间中国资本市场A股民营上市公司为研究样本,使用多元线性回归模型实证检验优化营商环境如何影响民营企业高管职务消费。研究结果显示:优化营商环境显著降低了民营企业高管职务消费,表明优化营商环境对民营企业高管职务消费具有抑制作用。进一步的分析表明,相较于股权激励程度较高的企业,优化营商环境对民营企业高管职务消费的抑制作用在股权激励程度较低的企业中更为显著;内部控制质量削弱了优化营商环境对民营企业高管职务消费的抑制作用。文章从民营企业高管职务消费视角考察了营商环境在微观企业中的治理效应,研究结论丰富了营商环境经济后果的相关研究,同时为如何抑制民营企业高管职务消费提供了新的参考思路。 Optimizing business environment can effectively restrain non-pecuniary compensation in private companies by reducing agency costs and maintaining good government-enterprise relations.However, this argument has not received attention from academia.This paper takes A-share private listed companies from 2009 to 2019 in Chinese capital market as samples, and to empirically test how optimizing business environment affects non-pecuniary compensation in private companies by using multivariable linear regression model.The research results indicate that optimizing business environment has reduced non-pecuniary compensation in private companies significantly, which is reflected that business environment improvement has restraining effect on non-pecuniary compensation in private companies.Further analysis shows that the restraining effect of business environment improvement on non-pecuniary compensation in private companies with lower equity incentive is more obvious than that of the private companies with higher equity incentive;there is a weakening moderating effect of internal control quality on the relationship between business environment improvement and non-pecuniary compensation in private companies.The article examines governance effects of business environment in micro-enterprises from the perspective of non-pecuniary compensation in private companies.The research conclusion enriches researches related to economic consequences of business environment and provides a new reference idea for how to restrain non-pecuniary compensation in private companies.

作者周泽将胡梦菡王浩然 ZHOU Ze-jiang;HU Meng-han;WANG Hao-ran

机构地区安徽大学商学院安徽大学经济学院

出处《中央财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第1期99-109,共11页 Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基金国家自然科学基金面上项目“组织权威、经济独立性与监事会治理研究:理论框架与实证检验”(项目编号:72172001) 安徽省高校协同创新项目“营商环境优化的微观政策效应研究”(项目编号:GXXT-2021-042) 安徽省哲学社会科学规划重点项目“营商环境优化与企业财务行为:机理分析与实证检验”(项目编号:AHSKZ2021D07)。

关键词营商环境民营企业高管职务消费股权激励内部控制 Business environment Private company Non-pecuniary Compensation Equity incentive Internal control

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]