摘要
针对零售商主导的考虑政府补贴和规模效应的动力电池闭环供应链,研究成员最优决策及协调问题。分别在无补贴、补贴零售商、补贴制造商、补贴第三方回收商四种情形下,分析了补贴对象、规模效应、再制造动力电池比例对成员最优决策及利润的影响,并实现了闭环供应链的协调。研究表明:政府补贴能够降低零售价,提高回收率以及各成员利润;补贴第三方回收商相比补贴零售商和补贴制造商而言,回收率以及第三方回收商利润提高更为明显,补贴零售商和补贴制造商相比补贴第三方回收商而言,零售价降低、制造商和零售商利润提高更为明显;可用于再制造的废旧动力电池比例增大能够降低动力电池销售价格,提高动力电池回收率;第三方回收商规模效应的增大有利于降低零售价格,提高动力电池产品回收率及闭环供应链各成员收益。
For a closed-loop supply chain that considers government subsidies and economies of scale,the decision and coordination under the premise of the retailer’s leadership are focused on.Under the four situations of no subsidy,subsidized retailer,subsidized manufacturer,subsidized third-party recycler,the influence of subsidy object,scale effect,and remanufactured power battery ratio on members'optimal decision-making and profits are analyzed respectively.The results show that government subsidies can reduce retail prices,increase recovery rate and members’profits;Compared with subsidizing retailer and subsidizing manufacturer,subsidizing third-party recycler can increase the recovery rate and the profits of third-party recycler more obviously.Compared with subsidizing third-party recycler,subsidizing retailer and subsidizing manufacturer can reduce retail prices and increase the profits of manufacturer and retailer more obviously;The increase in the proportion of power batteries that can be used for remanufacturing can reduce the sales price of power batteries and increase the recovery rate of power batteries;The increase in third-party recycler’s economies of scale is conducive to reducing retail prices,increasing the recovery rate and the revenue of each member.
作者
张川
陈宇潇
ZHANG Chuan;CHEN Yu-xiao(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第12期72-77,91,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL229)。
关键词
闭环供应链
政府补贴
规模效应
动力电池
供应链协调
closed-loop supply chain
government subsidy
economies of scale
power battery
supply chain coordination
