摘要
目前关于高校科研项目奖励制度的分析主要是归纳奖励制度“是什么样”以及建议“应该怎样”,缺乏一个理论框架论证制度为什么“应该那样”。将高校教师厌恶风险这一特征纳入分析框架,构建一个经济学模型阐明高校科研项目奖励制度的内在逻辑。由于现行奖励制度一般只奖励“成功的结果”,无法降低或消除高校教师申报项目面临的收益风险,因而是一种无效率的制度。本文进一步探讨了什么是有效率的制度及其实施面临的一些约束,表明高校能够实行的科研项目奖励制度虽然不是最有效率的制度,但其结果要优于现行只奖励“成功”的制度。
At present,the analysis of the reward system of scientific research projects in universities is mainly to sum up what the reward system looks like and how it should be,lacking a theoretical framework to demonstrate why the system is like this and why it should be like that.In this paper,the characteristics of risk aversion of university teachers are included in the analysis framework,and an economic model is constructed to illustrate the internal logic of reward system of scientific research projects in universities.As the current reward system only rewards"successful result",it cannot reduce or eliminate the risk of income faced by university teachers applying for projects,so it is an inefficient system.This paper further discusses what is an efficient system and some constraints it faces.It shows that although the reward system for scientific research projects that universities can implement is not the most efficient system,the results are better than the system that only rewards"success".
作者
王春雷
WANG Chunlei(School of Economics,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004,China)
出处
《科学与管理》
2021年第6期86-91,共6页
Science and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目(71363006)。
关键词
高校教师
科研项目
奖励制度
效率
university teacher
scientific research project
reward system
efficiency
