摘要
低碳技术创新的双重外部性与“搭便车”风险严重制约了我国低碳技术创新联盟的稳定发展。基于此背景,运用随机博弈模型分析多主体惩罚机制对低碳技术创新联盟演化的影响,结果表明:多主体惩罚机制的实施能有效提升低碳技术创新联盟的稳定性。其中,第二方惩罚机制是影响低碳技术创新联盟稳定性的主要因素,第一方与第三方惩罚机制及随机干扰则对联盟的稳定速率有重要影响。为促进我国低碳技术创新联盟稳定发展,助力“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的实现,进一步从政策制定与管理实践角度提出优化我国低碳技术创新联盟稳定性的对策建议。
The double externalities and free-riding risks limited the stable development of low carbon technology innovation alliance.To solve the problem,this paper used stochastic evolutionary game model to illustrate the influence of multi-agent punishment mechanism on alliance low carbon technology innovation alliance stability.The results showed that:Multi-agent punishment mechanism could improve the stability of low carbon technology innovation alliance obviously.Where,the second party punishment was the main factor affecting the stability of low carbon technology innovation alliance.In addition,the first party punishment,third party punishment and the stochastic interference had effect on alliance′s evolution.Further,this paper put forward advice for improving low carbon technology innovation alliance stability form the prospect of policy formulation.
作者
刘苹
张一
汪熠杰
LIU Ping;ZHANG Yi;WANG Yi-jie(School of Business Management,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610064,China;School of Business and Tourism Management,Yunnan University,Kunming 650500,China)
出处
《资源开发与市场》
CAS
北大核心
2022年第1期16-22,共7页
Resource Development & Market
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“西部民族地区旅游地利益诉求演化机理及适应性机制研究”(编号:71663061)。
关键词
低碳技术创新
碳中和
惩罚
稳定性
随机演化博弈
low-carbon innovation
carbon neutralization
punishment
stability
stochastic evolutionary game
