摘要
目前学界对梦境怀疑论的传统处理面临着诸多困境,本文试图结合概念分析和梦境认知神经科学的研究成果,为解决梦境怀疑论提供帮助。梦境怀疑论的前提"梦境与清醒不可区分"和表达形式"我怀疑我在做梦"都存在问题:梦境与清醒在情境认知层面有着本质区别,说明怀疑论语境中二者不可区分的基础是错误的,我们可以据此抵御怀疑论;梦境怀疑论的表达形式源于反思认知,但是情境认知不能产生怀疑,这表明梦境怀疑论的表达形式有特殊限定,我们可以据此终止怀疑论。非清醒的梦、假清醒的梦、清醒的梦等产生的梦境难题,以及来自极端怀疑论的梦境挑战,都能在上述框架下得到解决。认知神经科学与哲学交叉视域下的反梦境怀疑论研究是回答传统哲学问题的一个新的解决路径,同时也能为其他相关领域的交叉研究提供借鉴。
The traditional treatments of dream skepticism face many difficulties.The combination of conceptual analysis with the achievements from the study of dreaming in cognitive neuroscience will however help to resolve it.Both the premise of dream skepticism,"Dreaming and awaking are indistinguishable",and its form as expression,"I suspect that I am dreaming",have problems:dreaming and being awake are essentially different at the level of state cognition,which illustrates that the basis for the indistinguishability of the two in the context of skepticism is wrong,and can be used to resist skepticism.Meanwhile,the expression form of dream skepticism is rooted in reflective cognition,but state cognition cannot produce doubt,indicating that the expression form has special restrictions,and skepticism can be terminated accordingly.Under this conceptual scheme,dreaming puzzles coming from nonlucid dreams,fake awaking dreams,lucid dreams,and the challenge from radical skepticism could also be solved.This research is an interdisciplinary study based on conceptual analysis and empirical evidence,aiming to investigate a new possible route for answering traditional philosophical questions,and at the same time to provide insight for interdisciplinary study in other related areas.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第10期118-127,F0003,共11页
Philosophical Research
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目“前后期维特根斯坦哲学的连续性研究”(编号17CZX046)的阶段性成果。
