摘要
运用2007—2014年中国上市公司数据,探究卖空压力对企业费用粘性的政策处理效应和二者之间的作用渠道,并从分析师跟踪人数和高管权益薪酬占比的角度,探究卖空压力对企业费用粘性的异质性影响。研究结果表明,实施卖空管制放松政策之后,试点企业总费用粘性显著提升38.89%;企业研发支出强度增大与融资约束程度降低是卖空压力提升企业费用粘性的重要作用渠道;放松卖空管制政策对费用粘性的作用强度依赖于公司的分析师跟踪人数和高管权益薪酬占比。研究发现,当企业的分析师跟踪人数较少时,放松卖空管制对企业费用粘性的提升效果更为显著;当企业高管权益薪酬占比越大时,卖空压力对企业费用粘性的提升作用越强。对以上分析结果分别进行安慰剂检验、PSM-DID检验和排除其他政策干扰的稳健性检验,并验证了双重差分模型的平行趋势假说,结论基本与基准回归模型保持一致。研究结果不仅丰富了放松卖空管制政策经济后果的研究,为放松卖空管制的政策效果提供了可量化的证据,同时也为提升企业内部资源配置效率提供参考。
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007-2014,the paper explores the policy treatment effect of short-selling pressure on corporate’s cost stickiness and the channels of interaction between them.From the perspective of?analysts'tracking number and the proportion of executives'equity compensation,it studies the heterogeneity impact of short-selling pressure on corporate’s cost stickiness.The results show that after the implementation of the short-selling deregulation policy,the total cost stickiness of the pilot enterprises has increased significantly by 38.89%;the increase of corporate’s R&D expenditure and the reduction of corporate’s financing constraints are important channels for short-selling pressure to increase corporate cost stickiness;the intensity of the policy's effect on cost stickiness depends on the company's analyst’s tracking number and executives’equity compensation.The study has found that when the number of a corporate’s analysts’tracking number is small,the effect of short-selling on corporate’s cost stickiness is more significant;the higher the proportion of corporate executives'compensation,the stronger the effect of short-selling pressure on the firm’s stickiness of cost.The above analysis results were tested by placebo test,PSM-DID test and robustness test for eliminating other policy interference,and verified by the parallel trend hypothesis of the difference-in-difference model.The conclusions were basically consistent with the results of the benchmark regression model.The results has not only enriched the study of the economic consequences of short-selling deregulation policy,and provided quantifiable evidence for the policy effect of short-selling deregulation,but also has provided a reference for improving the efficiency of internal resource allocation.
作者
陶长琪
丁煜
TAO Changqi;DING Yu(School of Statistics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,Jiangxi)
出处
《管理学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期1-23,共23页
Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(19ZDA121)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973055,71773041)
江西省社会科学基金项目(19YJ15)
江西省教育厅科技课题(GJJ190248)。
关键词
卖空压力
费用粘性
研发支出强度
融资约束
分析师跟踪人数
高管权益薪酬占比
short-selling pressure
firm’s cost stickiness
the intensity of R&D expenditures
financing constraints
analysts’tracking number
the proportion of executives'equity Compensation
