摘要
董事会监督能够对企业发挥显著的治理作用。基于中国上市企业2007—2018年的数据集,实证分析董事会监督对企业杠杆行为治理的效果。研究表明,董事会监督对企业去杠杆具有显著的功效。上述结论在经过多重稳健性检验后依旧显著成立。基于倾向得分匹配法对企业属性结构特征异质性进行检验后发现,董事会监督对非国有企业、高科技企业和小规模企业更加有效。从影响机制来分析,董事会监督能够在一定程度上降低企业的融资成本、提升主业业绩并实现内部财务风险的稳定,最终都将降低企业对杠杆的(过度)需求,从而起到了显著的去杠杆效果。
Board supervision can play a significant governance role in enterprises.Based on the data set of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018,this paper empirically analyzes the effect of board supervision on corporate governance of leverage.Studies have shown that board supervision has significant effects on corporate deleveraging.The above conclusions are still significant after multiple robustness tests.Secondly,based on the propensity score matching method,this paper tests the heterogeneity of corporate attribute structure characteristics and finds that board supervision is more effective for non-state-owned enterprises,high-tech enterprises and small-scale enterprises.Analyzed from the impact mechanism,board supervisors can reduce the financing cost of the company,improve the performance of the main business and achieve the stability of internal financial risks to a certain extent.The above improvements will ultimately reduce the(excessive)demand for leverage by the company,which will play a significant deleveraging effect.The research conclusions and policies of this article help to effectively promote structural deleveraging in the context of the new era,thereby providing the basic conditions for smooth operation and even high-quality development of enterprises.
作者
谢获宝
黄大禹
Xie Huobao;Huang Dayu(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan Hubei 430072,China)
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期81-91,共11页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“银行债务契约、财务报告质量与企业投资效率”(71072103)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“去杠杆影响企业风险承担的经济后果、机制路径及优化策略研究”(19YJA630093)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金“环境不确定性、成本粘性与企业盈余质量研究”(2016VI005)。
关键词
董事会监督
杠杆率
倾向得分匹配
中介效应
board supervision
leverage ratio
propensity score matching
intermediary effect
