摘要
本文旨在从异质性视角深入探讨管理层激励方式对企业研发投资的影响。在回顾相关理论的基础上,提出了关于管理层股权激励和薪酬激励对企业异质研发投资影响以及机构投资者持股对影响关系调节效应的基本假设,并利用中国上市公司2007—2016年的面板数据,采用两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS)进行了实证检验。研究结果表明:股权激励对研究投资和试验开发投资均有显著促进作用;薪酬激励对试验开发投资有正向影响,与研究投资间的关系则呈倒"U"型;随着持股比例的上升,机构投资者对企业投资决策的监督作用增强,这强化了股权激励对两种研发投资的促进作用,但薪酬激励对两种研发投资的影响被挤出;研发投资不仅可以提升企业当期绩效,对其未来绩效也有着积极影响,且研究投资和试验开发投资对企业未来绩效影响的持续期数存在明显差异。本文从异质性视角拓展了创新激励理论,对企业创新激励机制设计实践也具有一定的启发意义。
This paper aims to explore the impacts of management incentives on corporate R&D investment from the perspective of heterogeneity.Based on the review of relevant theories,this paper puts forward hypotheses about the impacts of equity incentive and compensation incentive on heterogeneous R&D investment and the moderating effect of institutional investor shareholding on the above relationships.Then,using the panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016,the two-stage least square method(2 SLS)is adopted to conduct an empirical test.The results show that equity incentive has a significant promoting effect on both research investment and development investment.Compensation incentive has a positive effect on development investment,while the relationship between compensation incentive and research investment shows an inverted"U"shape.With the increase of the shareholding ratio,the supervisory role of institutional investors on corporate investment decision becomes stronger,which strengthens the impacts of equity incentive on research investment and development investment,and crowds out the impacts of compensation incentive.R&D investment can not only improve the current corporate performance,but also have positive effects on future corporate performances,and there is an obvious period difference between the impacts of research investment and development investment on future corporate performances.The possible theoretical contributions of this paper are as follows.First,based on the perspective of heterogeneity,the impact mechanisms of equity incentive and compensation incentive on research investment and development investment are explored,and conclusions such as the threshold effect of the impact of compensation incentive on research investment are obtained.This makes up for the lack of structural attention to R&D investment and expands the research on management incentives and corporate R&D investment.Second,the promoting or crowding-out effect of institutional investor shareholding(external governance mec
作者
马庆魁
樊梦晨
Ma Qingkui;Fan Mengchen(School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,Liaoning,China)
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第9期140-149,共10页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71403037,2015.01—2017.12)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(DUT17RW120,2017.01—2018.12)
辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题(2021lslybkt-018,2020.08—2021.09)。
关键词
异质研发投资
股权激励
薪酬激励
机构投资者持股
heterogeneous R&D investment
equity incentive
compensation incentive
institutional investor shareholding
