摘要
归谬法与归谬翻转法是佛教知识论中一组重要的论证方法。一直以来关于它们的研究,多以陈那、法称及其后学为关注点,时而会关注到中观派的清辨论师。众所周知,归谬法是中观派,特别是被后世称为“中观应成派”的学者月称所倚重的论证手段。然而,令人意外的是,先行研究在对归谬法与归谬翻转法的考察中,都普遍忽略了月称,特别是没有意识到月称以自他共比量理论重塑了归谬翻转法的意义这一点。本文在分析月称《明句论》文本的基础上指出,清辨与月称二人都承袭了陈那的做法,以归谬翻转法来为归谬法的合法性做辩护;不过,二者不同之处在于,前者与陈那一样将归谬翻转式视为共比量,而后者将其视为对论者自许的他比量。这是月称既不同于其思想来源的陈那、清辨,也不同于法称及其后学的最关键之处。
The prasanga(reductio ad absurdum) and prasangaviparyaya(reversion from the prasanga’s statement by means of the contraposition) are an important group of argumen-tation methods in Buddhist epistemology. Studies on them have been mostly focused on the interpretations of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their later scholars, with occasional at-tention to Bhāviveka, a Madhyamaka scholar. It is well known that the prasanga was a means of argument relied upon by Mādhyamikas, especially by Candrakīrti, later known as a * Prāsangika. However, it is surprising that the previous studies have generally overlooked Candrakīrti in their examination of the prasanga and the prasangaviparyaya,despite the fact that Candrakīrti reshaped the meaning of the prasanga with the theory of the three kinds of inferences, namely inferences accepted by self, by others and by both.This paper, based on an analysis of the text of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, points out that both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti inherited Dignāga’s practice of using the prasan-gaviparyaya to justify the legitimacy of the prasanga;however, they differ in that the former, just like Dignāga, regards the proof of the prasangaviparyaya as an inference accepted by both, while the latter regards it as an inference accepted by others. This is the key difference between Candrakīrti and his sources of thought, Dignāga and Bhāviveka,as well as Dharmakīrti and his successors.
出处
《逻辑学研究》
CSSCI
2021年第4期77-88,共12页
Studies in Logic
基金
中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目“藏译《中论·无畏疏》译注与研究”(19XNF031)阶段性研究成果。
