摘要
个人同一性这一哲学经典问题,在当代最具吸引力的研究进路是心理连续性理论,其中,新洛克主义代表帕菲特给出的诊断具有深刻影响。但帕菲特对经验的"去人称"化处理使得经验沦为价值中立的事件,从而个人的持续生存仅仅是与死亡相对的存活,而不是作为理性行动者的继续存在。帕菲特的理论困境与同一性要求存在冲突。为此首先需要澄清:人们在什么意义上将同一性赋予了实际上的差异性?放弃传统的时刻同一性确认思路,重新表述对持存问题的设问,进而尝试从语言角度探讨理解同一性的途径,有望走出困局。这一途径不再单纯强调时间片段中经验的联系性,不把自我看作由事件经验本身决定的,而将自我看作个人借助语言对其经验的赋归、阐释和预期。这种融贯一致但又持续修正的反思性重构,确保了具有内在关联的经验融入并造就一个有意义的整体--"我"。如此,历时的同一性不是一种已然成型并等待发现的实在,而取决于人们用什么方式将现在的自我与过去之我和未来之我塑造为同一。
The most inviting approach to the classic philosophical problem of personal identity is the theory of psychological continuity,where the diagnosis given by Parfit,a representative of Neo-lockeanism,has had a profound impact.But Parfit’s depersonalization of experience makes experience a value-neutral event,so that a person’s continuous life is merely survival as opposed to death,rather than a continued existence as a rational agent.Therefore,we need first of all to clarify this point:in what sense do we assign identity to actual differences?This paper starts with the conflict between Parfit’s theoretical flaws and the requirements of identity.It abandons the traditional idea of confirming momentary identity and reformulates the problem of persistence.The author aims to understand personal identity from a linguistic point of view which no longer simply emphasizes the connection of experiences in time fragments and does not regard the self as determined by the event experience itself,but rather regards the self as a person’s coherent appropriation,interpretation and anticipation of his experience with the help of language.This reflective reconfiguration,which is consistent but continuously revised,ensures that the internally related experiences are integrated into and create a meaningful whole–"I".In this way,diachronic identity is not a reality that has been formed and is waiting to be discovered,but depends on how people shape the present self into a whole with the past self and the future self.
出处
《中国社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第8期98-116,206,共20页
Social Sciences in China
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“个人同一性研究的当代发展”(18ZDA029)阶段性成果。