摘要
基于政策传导视角,本文系统考察了党组织参与公司治理如何影响民营企业的投资-政策不确定性敏感度。实证结果显示,当党组织参与公司治理时,经济政策不确定性对民营企业固定资产投资的抑制作用被显著弱化;且该效应在市场化程度高的地区和融资约束轻的企业中更为凸显。进一步研究发现,党组织参与公司治理的作用效果还会因党组织参与公司治理的方式不同而存在显著差异,具体表现为:当党组织参与公司董事会治理或管理层治理时,经济政策不确定性对固定资产投资的抑制作用被显著弱化;而当党组织参与公司监事会治理时,该效应并不存在。作用机制检验发现,党组织参与公司治理有助于提升民营企业的政策信息获取能力和理解能力,从而降低了企业层面的不确定性。本文结论表明,党组织参与公司治理可以帮助民营企业及时获取并准确理解政策信息、掌握政府经济调控方向,从而缓解经济政策不确定性对企业投资的负向冲击。
This paper systematically explores how the party participates in corporate governance affects the investment-policy uncertainty sensitivity of private enterprises from the perspective of policy transmission. The empirical results show that when the party organization participates in corporate governance, the inhibitory effect of the uncertainty of economic policy on the fixed asset investment of private enterprises is significantly weakened, and this effect is more prominent in regions with high marketization and companies with light financing constraints. Further research finds that there exists significant variation in the impact of the party participating in corporate governance due to the different ways that party organizations participate in corporate governance. The specific manifestation is as follows: the inhibitory effect of the uncertainty of economic policy on the fixed asset investment in private enterprises is significantly weakened only when the party organization participates in corporate board governance or corporate governance, whereas this inhibiting effect does not exist when the party organization participate in corporate supervisory board governance. And the mechanism test suggests that the participation of party organization in corporate governance is conducive to improve the policy acquisition and understanding capabilities of private enterprises, and hence reducing the uncertainty at the enterprise level. The conclusions of this paper show that the participation of party organizations in corporate governance can help private enterprises timely obtain and accurately understand the information of policy, grasping the direction of government economic regulation, and hence alleviating the negative impact of economic policy uncertainty on corporate investment.
作者
叶永卫
云锋
袁溥
Ye Yongwei;Yun Feng;Yuan Pu(School of Public Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics and Management,South China Normal University;International Business and Management Research Center,Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai)
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期3-16,共14页
Economic Review
基金
上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目“固定资产加速折旧政策的就业创造效应”
广州市哲学社会科学规划课题“儒家文化影响企业债券信用利差的理论和实证研究”(项目编号:2021GZGJ43)的资助。
关键词
党组织参与公司治理
政策不确定性
企业投资
政策传导
Party Organization Participation in Corporate Governance
Policy Uncertainty
Corporate Investment
Policy Transmission
