摘要
以沪深A股2004—2018年自然人控制的民营上市公司为研究对象,检验实际控制人境外居留权对过度投资的影响。研究表明:境外居留权加剧了企业的过度投资行为,自由现金流是境外居留权影响过度投资的中介路径。调节效应检验表明,两权分离诱发并强化了实际控制人的"掏空"动机,较高的两权分离度加剧境外居留权对过度投资的影响,但支付较高的现金股利能够减少企业用于过度投资的自由现金流,较高现金股利政策缓解了境外居留权对过度投资的影响。
This paper takes the private listed companies controlled by natural persons in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2004 to 2018 as the study objects to test the impact of the actual controller’s right of abode abroad on over-investment.The study shows that the right of abode abroad aggravates the over-investment behavior of enterprises,and the free cash flow is the intermediary path of the influence of the right of abode abroad on over-investment.The test of regulatory effect shows that the separation of the two rights induces and strengthens the"tunneling"motivation of the actual controller,and the higher degree of separation of the two rights aggravates the impact of the right of abode abroad on over-investment.However,paying higher cash dividends can reduce the free cash flow of enterprises for over-investment,and the higher cash dividend policy alleviates the impact of overseas residence rights on over-investment.
作者
骆长琴
LUO Changqin(School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期111-120,共10页
Economic Survey
基金
河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2020BJJ008)。
关键词
境外居留权
过度投资
自由现金流
两权分离度
现金股利政策
Foreign Residency Rights
Over-investment
Free Cash Flows
Separation Degree of the Two Rights
Cash Dividend Policy
