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新能源汽车行业的政策设计及优化研究——基于Van Damme模型的三方演化博弈视角 被引量:6

Research on Policy Design and Optimization of New Energy Automobile Industry——The Perspective of the Three-party Evolutionary Game Based on the Van Damme Model
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摘要 在新能源汽车产业等新兴产业发展初期,政府政策是影响产业发展的关键因素。本文基于Van Damme模型建立新能源汽车企业、政府、消费者两阶段三方演化博弈模型,并用MATLAB模拟在新能源汽车的研发收益、成本以及政府对车企骗补处罚金额和比例变化时三者的策略选择,最终得出均衡状态。研究表明:三方最终会达到E(1,1,1)稳定状态,形成车企研发创新、政府积极监管、消费者购买的均衡策略。在新能源汽车行业的发展过程中,政府应当考虑由财政补贴转向研发补贴,过高的补贴金额和过低的惩罚成本均不利于企业加大研发投入,将研发补贴策略与惩罚机制组合使用才能有效减少车企骗补的行为,以促进新能源汽车产业健康、快速发展。 In the early development of emerging industries such as the new energy automobile industry,government policies are a key factor affecting the development of the industry.Based on the Van Damme model,this paper establishes an two-stage three-party evolutionary game model between new energy automobile companies,governments,and consumers to analyze the evolutionary stability strategies,and uses MATLAB software to simulate the behavior changes of car companies,governments,and consumers when the R&D benefits and costs of new energy vehicles,as well as the amount and proportion of the government's fraudulent compensation penalty for car companies changes,and finally an equilibrium state is reached.The research shows that the three parties will eventually reach a stable state of E(1,1,1),and the three parties will achieve a balanced strategy of R&D and innovation by auto companies,active government supervision,and consumer purchases.In the development process of the new energy automobile industry,the government should consider shifting from financial subsidies to R&D subsidies.Excessive subsidies and low penalty costs are not conducive to enterprises to increase R&D investment.Combining the subsidy policy and the penalty mechanism can effectively reduce the fraud of car companies,so as to promote the healthy and rapid development of the new energy automobile industry.
作者 傅沂 姜明明 杨东晓 Fu Yi;Jiang Mingming;Yang Dongxiao(Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;College of Economics and Trade,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China)
出处 《工业技术经济》 北大核心 2021年第10期23-32,共10页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金 湖南省自然科学基金项目_青年项目“动态视角下新能源汽车产业新政的影响效应研究”(项目编号:2020JJ5111) 湖南省社会科学评审委项目_一般项目“政策突变背景下湖南省新能源汽车产业政策的理论与经验研究”(项目编号:XSP20YBZ081) 湖南工商大学青年教师创新驱动计划项目“新能源汽车产业发展的政府激励机制及政策路径研究”(项目编号:19QD04)。
关键词 新能源汽车补贴 战略性新兴产业 两阶段三方演化博弈 车企骗补 政府监管 研发创新 new energy vehicle subsidies strategic emerging industries two-stage and three-party evolutionary game car companies subsidy cheating government regulation R&D
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